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INTRODUCTION 
STATEMENT OF RESEARCH INTEREST 
The Issue of Global Warming and Uncertainties Concerning Climate Change 
Uncertainty has always been a factor that complicates the decision making 
process. Unfortunately, many decisions have to be made before there is certainty. 
Whether or not there should be policies regulating econqmic activities to reduce the 
potential damages of the possible climate chru;ige caused by global warming is a very 
good example of decision making with uncertainty. 
There are many aspects of uncertainty concerning global warming. A slightly 
higher mean temperature on the earth's surface has been observed over the past 
several decades; however, it has not been confirmed whether this is just normal long-
run variation or evidence of greenhouse warming. Many scientists believe that the 
earth is indeed on a warming trend as a result of the accumulation of greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere, but so far not much is· known for sure about what damages this 
warming and related climate change will do to the ecosystem of this planet or to 
human society. Much more information 'is needed to help us understand the issue 
better and to help us determine what should be done, how to do it, and how much it 
will cost to carry out the appropriate actions. 
On the global level, because of the uncertainties, whether action is or is not 
taken today against the possibility of global climate change involves a risk of losing in 
terms of economic well-being. If we believe global warming is very likely to occur, 
and, when it does, that the damages will be tremendous, action now to prevent further 
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climate change may be justified. Then, if climate change does not occur as we believe 
it would, we would be responding to a problem that does not exist after all. The 
efforts to avoid damages would incur costs in terms of abatement investments 
( consumption foregone) or slower growth in the production of normal goods and 
services (foregone GDP). When global warming does not occur as predicted (or, in the 
similar sense, if the impacts of global climate change are not as much as what we 
think they would be), these costs would produce net economic losses since there 
would be no benefits in terms of avoided damages ( or the investments made according 
to our understanding today would not produce benefits as large as expected, which 
makes the investment worth less than. we assume today). 
On the other hand, if we do cling to the argument that there is currently no 
reliable evidence of global climate change therefore carry on economic activities as 
usual, we then take the risk of running into the. consequences of the problem head on 
when global climate change does occur sometime in the future, without having 
sufficient knowledge and experience, or most importantly, without having sufficient 
time to deal with the consequences of the problem in a satisfactory way. The damages 
caused by climate change due to or related to global warming may turn out to be 
much larger than the costs of actions taken. 
Because global warming and climate change would affect almost every country 
in the world, efforts to limit global climate change require worldwide cooperation. 
However, since the role of each country in causing climate change is different, and the 
consequences of global warming will not be felt equally by all countries or regions, 
any attempt to responsibility-sharing will be fruitless until there is a full assessment of 
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how each country will be affected by the consequences of global climate change and 
how much it would cost each country to participate in abatement actions. As long as 
each country is a sovereign state, national interest will always be a powerful force 
affecting international cooperation. In fact, without better understanding and 
assessment of benefits and costs of abatement actions by a country, there would be 
incomplete commitment toward policy cooperation. 
These uncertainties underscore the need for further research in all aspects of 
the issue. Many questions involving global warming and climate change as well as 
their economic consequences have to be answered to an acceptable degree before 
decisions concerning what should be done, and by whom, will be made. 
Researches on Global Warmin~ and Economic Consequences 
Scientists have learned_ that carbon dioxide and other trace gases have 
accumulated in the atmosphere. These trace gases admit short-wave radiation from the 
sun to the earth but block the infrared long-wave radiation from the earth to outer 
space. The thermal radiation kept in the lower atmosphere by the trace gases warms 
up the earth and makes it more suitable for life to exist. This process is called the 
"greenhouse effect", and the trace gases are called greenhouse gases (GHGs). 
Scientists also know that human activities such as fossil fuel ( e.g. coal and oil) 
burning and deforestation increase the emissions of GHGs. When emitted, some 
portion of the GHGs accumulates and remains in the atmosphere for many years (from 
decades to more than a century, depending on the gas). This raises the concern that if 
we keep emitting GHGs the way we have been, excessive amow;its of GHGs will 
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accumulate in the atmosphere, and as a result, the mean temperature on the earth's 
surface will rise (global warming). Together with other climate change caused by or 
related to a warmer globe, there may be serious impacts on many aspects of daily 
living. 
While scientists are working to find out more about our climatic system and 
the interactions between its different components, economists are working on other 
aspects of the issue. Some economists have focused on estimating the costs of 
emission reductions, others on the benefits from emission control actions. Progress in 
the policy arena requires the integration of the work of scientists and economists. 
Fortunately, economists have developed models that capture some of the . . 
relationships between GHG emissions, climate change, and their economic 
consequences. These models are categorized as emission:-climate-economic 
consequences models. These models typically incorporate a traditional economic sector 
that is linked to a simple climate factor or a very much simplified climate model. 
Their purpose is to capture the economic consequences of the climate change and to 
estimate the costs of abatement actions directed toward GHGs. 
One of the most widely-cited models is the Dynamic Integrated model of 
Climate and the Economy (DICE) developed by Nordhaus. This is a general 
equilibrium optimization model which maximizes the present value of the world 
consumption over time subject to certain economic, emissions, and climate constraints. 
Nordhaus uses this model to evaluate the economic impacts of several policy options 
in terms of GDP foregone and changes in consumption levels. Based on these impacts, 
policies are ranked and suggestions for policy actions are made. 
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Most of the emission-climate-economic consequences models have several 
things in common. For one, they all agree that China will play a vital role in causing 
global warming, and that it will be a key player in curbing the problem. Yet, there has 
been no explicit and exclusive estimates of impacts done for China only, from the 
perspective of China's national interest, to provide the foundation for China's policy 
making concerning options for limiting global climate change. In fact, the focus of the 
estimates usually is a developed country or countries (most likely the USA or the 
OECD members, perhaps because of data availability and funding for research 
institutes in these countries). These estimates are often generalized and extended to a 
global scale based on the results for the developed country or countries. There have 
been few systematic quantitative estimates for developing countries, however, even 
though it is commonly agreed that they will contribute more to the. problem given their 
large potential for future growth. The damages from climate change may also be more 
severe for developing countries both because climate-sensitive sector constitutes a 
larger share of their economies and they lack resources and technology to adapt to 
changing climate. 
Importance of China's Role in the Issue 
There are several reasons why China warrants special focus in the issue of 
global warming. China is known as a country with a long history and a huge 
population. Its current population of more than 1.2 billion makes up one-fifth of the 
world total. Recently, China has experienced rapid economic growth. This 
combination of a large population and rapidly increasing purchasing power promises 
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enormous market potential. China is also a country with a rich endowment of natural 
resources, among them, coal reserves. According to the 1994 Statistical Yearbook of 
China, as of 1993, China had a coal reserve of more than 1000 billion tons, the largest 
in the world. In fact, since 1989, China has been the number one coal producer in the 
world. By 1995, coal production reached 1.28 billion tons. Still, the demand for energy 
outweighs the country's production capacity. With the expected fast growth of the 
economy in the next several decades and .the relative lack of other major energy 
sources, the coal industry will be an important drive of the entire national economy. 
The high demand for power and energy will keep coal production at high levels, 
which will result in more carbon dioxide emissions. 
With its large population, rapid economic growth, high and increasing demand 
for energy, and especially its rich endowment of coal reserves, China will play a 
critical part in the success ( or failure) of the worldwide effort to limit global warming 
and climate change. China may have to make a special effort and commitment toward 
limiting carbon dioxide emissions if the global effort is to succeed. 
China has much to lose if global climate change does occur as predicted. 
Global warming is expected to raise sea levels which is associated with land loss, 
species loss, increased flooding, water contamination, and loss of structures and 
recreational facilities in coastal cities and ports. China's most advanced economic 
areas are almost all along its coast. Coastal provinces like Guangdong and Fujian are 
pioneers in the economic takeoff over the past couple of decades and they host many 
Special Economic Zones that are designed as local or national economic driving 
forces. Hainan, the newly established province to attract foreign investment, is in fact 
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a tiny island. Coastal cities are usually heavily populated and have already been 
experiencing difficulties in water supply and other living conditions. 
Shanghai is a good example. In 1980, this city, with 0.06 percent of the 
national land area and 1.2 percent of the country's population, created more than 12 
percent of the national industrial product and accounted for one-third of the central 
government's financial expenditures. In 1993, it contributed almost 5 percent of 
China's GDP. Shanghai is also the first consideration of many foreign investors when 
they try to locate new ventures in China. On the other hand, high population density, 
large scale industrial activities, and heavy construction have also created 
environmental problems for this crowded place. Housing , transportation and water 
supply have always presented serious problems. Heavy reliance on ground water has 
caused a severe land sinking problem. If increases in the sea level were added to all 
the problems it has now, Shanghai would face heavy losses in capital investment, 
infrastructure, and wetlands. 
If the sea level does rise as a result of global warming, the large population in 
the coastal areas may have to relocate. The cost of migration could be tremendous. 
Various impacts of climate· change, such as deterioration of living standards, shortages 
in water supply, and losses of valuable lands that are important in grain production 
(the Yangtze and Pearl deltas, for example) and for other purposes (i.e., wetlands) may 
develop into social chaos that would damage the ground for a stable society. 
China was isolated from the rest of the world for almost 30 years. Instead' of 
developing the economy and providing a good living environment and a higher living 
standard for its people, the country was engaged in one political "mass movement" 
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after another, consumed by an ideological struggle. When China was finally able to 
break down the walls surrounding itself and face the world, it was stunned by the gap 
between the economic situation it was in and the living standard people in other 
countries enjoyed. There was a sense of urgency to catch up with the rest of the 
world. All of a sudden, economic development became the number one priority for 
everyone. Current government policies are in favor of anything that can stimulate 
economic growth, ordinary people are impatient to get rich, the temptations from 
material commodities are hard to resist, and no one ever feels rich enough soon 
enough. This feverish pursuit of economic well-being is so overwhelming that any 
attempt to slow it down is bound to be tough and time consuming. 
In the middle of the rush for economic growth, at least two points have to be 
made firm and clear for China to be convinced to commit to the cause of limiting 
global warming and climate change. First, China would suffer huge losses if global 
warming does occur, and second, the potential losses caused by climate change would 
be larger than the cost of slower economic growth. The degree to which it is optimal 
for China to reduce GHG emissions by slowing economic growth in the coming 
decades depends. upon the relative size of these losses. . 
Research Interest and Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation will modify and apply the original DICE model developed by 
Nordhaus to the special case of China. Using the DICE-CHN model (the modified 
DICE model for China), the optimal path of GHG emissions by China will be 
estimated, given the objective of maximizing China's utility function only, rather than 
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the common global social well-being. Since the DICE model has the built-in capacity 
of variable control, several policy options will be explored and the impacts of the 
various policy options on emission reductions, output, and consumption will be 
simulated. These results will provide information needed for policy evaluation and 
cost-benefit assessment. Based on this information we will evaluate policy options 
from the perspective of China's national interest. 
The DICE-CHN model will be run in two different scenarios. The first scenario 
will reflect popular proposals to limit world total emissions, for example, to the 1990 
world total emissions level, 80% of the 1990 world total emissions level, or the 1995 
world total emissions level. The second scenario studies the cases when China takes 
no emission reductions or follows optimal emissions path. In each scenario, the focus 
will be on China's income levels and the optimal emission reduction rates as 
compared to the no control case. A comparison of results across the cases will 
determine the best policy option for China. 
A sensitivity analysis will be done to determine the impacts on the results 
when different values are assigned to some of the key parameters, such as the rate of 
social time preference, the damage function coefficient, and the decline rate of the 
emission-output ratio. The model results.may also be sensitive to the values of other 
parameters which warrants future studies and estimates. 
The dissertation starts in Chapter I with information about scientific findings on 
the possibility of global warming and climate change, debates over immediate actions, 
and the potential damages that may be caused by global climate change, and an 
introduction of emission control methods suggested by other researches. 
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A general description of China is provided in Chapter II, to show the role of 
China in causing global warming and climate change and how vulnerable it is to the 
potential damages of global climate change. Included in this chapter are information 
concerning its geographical location and climate types, natural resources, population, 
and environmental limitations, current and potential economic growth and 
development, energy demand, energy production, and the role of its energy sector in 
global carbon emissions. 
Chapter III contains a literature review which focuses on comparing and 
contrasting the basic structures of various emission-climate-economic consequences 
models. The original DICE model is introduced in this chapter. Modifications of that 
model will be detailed in Chapter IV, together with the estimates of the model's 
parameters. 
A summary of the model results from DICE-CHN is presented in Chapter IV, 
with the focus on impacts of various policy options on China's income and 
consumption levels, and optimal en;iission reduction rates by China under various 
scenanos. 
A sensitivity analysis in Chapter V determines the impacts on the model of 
changing assumptions about the values of some key parameters. 
The final chapter discusses the policy implications of the findings, the strength 
and weakness of the approach, and suggestions for future research. 
CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON GLOBAL WARMING 
Origin of Concern: Scientific Findings on Global Warming 
Scientists believe that there are at least five key factors that affect the climate 
of the earth: the slower-acting factors including the earth's orbital movements around 
the sun and the expansion and retreat of the polar ice caps, and the faster-acting 
factors such as atmospheric dust, feedbacks due to water vapor, clouds and snow, and 
the concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere. Each of these factors operates on a 
very different time scale. The earth's climatic system is thus a complex outcome 
determined by complicated interactions between the atmosphere, oceans, ice-caps, 
living things (plants, animals, human beings, etc.), and even rocks and sediment. This 
complexity makes it extremely difficult to predict with high confidence the changes in 
the climatic system. 
The methods applied in today's climatic change predictions are combinations 
of historical observations and theoretical calculations. In recent years, scientists have 
made tremendous progress with both of these techniques. Still, the unknown factors 
governing the climatic system are too much for the predictions to be accurate at very 
high confidence levels. 
Researchers are now able to get information on millions of years of the earth's 
climate history. By studying ice-cores and sediment-cores, scientists can determine, 
among other things, the temperature on the earth and the carbon dioxide content of the 
air at different times. These researches confirm that the carbon dioxide content of the 
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atmosphere and the air temperature on the earth are closely related; warmer periods 
are associated with high carbon dioxide content, and there is usually less carbon 
dioxide in the air when the world is cool. In the interglacial (warmer) periods, the 
carbon dioxide content averages around 280 part per million (ppm), or, 0.028 percent 
of the air in the atmosphere is carbon dioxide, while in the glacial (cooler) periods, the 
average goes down to 210 ppm, and may even fall to 180 ppm (Leggett, 1990, p. 19). 
Table 1.1 on page 13 shows several "warm" periods on the earth, with the 
temperatures and carbon dioxide concentrations at each time compared to today's 
observations. These records make scientists believe that, while changes in the way the 
earth orbits the sun switches the planet between glacial periods and interglacial 
periods, the orbital parameters alone are not strong enough to explain the rapidity and 
magnitude of the switches seen in the ice ... cores and sediment-cores; There has to be 
other factors that amplify the speed and magnitude ofthe changes, 1and the GHGs 
accumulated in the atmosphere is believed to be one of the most important factors. 
The mere existence of GHGs in the atmosphere and the greenhouse effect are 
themselves not worrisome. In fact, it is the very existence of the GHGs and the 
greenhouse effect that brings the mean temperature on the earth's surface to a 
currently comfortable 15° C. Without the GHGs in the atmosphere, that temperature 
would be about 35° C lower than it is, which would make the earth much less 
habitable for human and other life. What worries the scientists is the fact that, 
because of human activities, GHGs have been accumulating in the atmosphere at a 
pace that is unprecedented in the 10,000 years of human development. They fear that a 
large amount of GHGs accumulated in the atmosphere over a short period of time 
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Table 1.1 Warmer Periods on_thc Earth 
Temperatures CO2 Co1 
Years Ago Compared to Today inthe A 
140 - 66 million 10- 15° C higher 1410"' 2 
(dinosaur age) 
4.3 - 3.3 million 3 - 4° C higher 450ppn 
(Pliocene) -
125,000 (mid point) 2° C higher 280 - 30 
(Eemian) 
6,000 - 5,000 1 ° C higher 270 - 28 
(Holocene) 
----- -~--------·---- -·· 
S'aurces: Nationa!Academy ofSciences, 1991, p.87. 











Compared to 1989 
4 - 8 tiines higher 
1. 3 times higher 
82% 
.• 
0 pplll -180% 
Note: Modern mean temperature is J 5° C, and CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, 
as <f I <J89,' was 3 5 3 ppm. 
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may cause irreversible changes in the climatic system and damages to the ecosystem 
of the earth and to many aspects of human life. 
Among the GHGs, carbon dioxide is believed to be the largest contributor to 
total radiative forcing (the factors that perturb the balance between the solar energy 
absorbed by the earth and the radiation emitted to space from the earth). According to 
the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report in 1990, methane contributes 
about 15 percent to total radiative forcing, and the contribution of nitrous oxide is only 
6 percent. Chlorofluorocarbon (CFCs) were previously thought to contribute about 24 
percent to total radiative forcing, but new findings suggest that CFCs' share may be 
much smaller since the build-up of CFCs removes lower ozone, another greenhouse 
gas, thereby offsetting the greenhouse effect caused by CFCs themselves. It is 
estimated that carbon dioxide has historically contributed at least two-thirds to 80 
percent of total radiative forcing, and this fraction is expected to be maintained in the 
future. 
The major sources of carbon dioxide emissions due to human activities are the 
burning of fossil fuels and deforestation. IPCC (1990) reports that the carbon dioxide 
content in the atmosphere before industrialization was about 280 ppm, or the 
equivalent of 570 Gts (gagitons, or billion tons) of carbon. Since 1860, human 
activities have added more than 175 Gts of carbon to the atmosphere, resulting in a 
carbon dioxide content of 315 ppm in 1958 and 353 ppm in 1989. Using climate 
models, scientists predict that a carbon dioxide content of twice the preindustrialization 
level will result in a 1.5-4.5° C increase in the earth's mean surface temperature, with 
the best guess at 2.5° C. The doubling of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is expected 
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to be reached some time before the middle of the next century if nothing is done to 
slow the carbon dioxide emissions trend. 
To make the situation more worrisome, there are still plenty of carbon-rich 
fossil fuel reserves available on the earth. Among all the fossil fuels, coal has the 
highest concentration of carbon. With modem technology, about 20,000 Gt of coal can 
be mined at costs that are considerably lower than the price levels required to suppress 
demand to the level that is necessary for the stabilization of global carbon dioxide 
emissions. Leggett (1990) estimated that about 5,000 to 10~000 Gt of carbon are 
contained in fossil fuel reserves, 4,000 Gt in proven coal and oil reserves, with at least 
730 Gt in China alone. If the fossil fuel reserves are consumed at a speed that would 
exhaust them in 300 years, Sundquist (1990) projected that the atmosphere 
concentration of carbon dioxide would rise to 1600 ppm in 250 years (5.7 times the 
preindustrial level) and level out at about 700 ppm 50 years after that. 
As noted, a high concentration of carbon dioxide in the air is accompanied 
usually by high temperatures on the earth. A higher mean temperature is only one 
consequence of high concentrations of carbon dioxide, however. Others are more 
serious changes in precipitation, and in the intensity and frequency of hurricanes and 
storms. 
Some scientists believe that there are already early signs of global warming. 
According to the IPCC Report (1990), over the past 100 years or so, while the carbon 
dioxide content in the atmosphere has gone up by 25 percent (from 280 ppm to 353 
ppm and accordingly the amount of carbon accumulation in the atmosphere increases 
from 570 Gts to 750 Gts), the average world surface temperature has risen by 0.3-0.6° 
15 
C, compared to a 2° C increase in the last 10,000 years. In the meanwhile, the global 
mean sea level has risen by about 15 cm, or about 1-2 mm per year. Precipitation 
patterns have also changed in some regions. The incidence of light and moderate 
rainfall has declined sharply, while one-day downpours of 2 inches or more have 
become increasingly common in the past two decades. The frequencies of severe 
floods and hurricanes have also increased, causing significant damages to property, 
crops and lives. 
This evidence and the predictions from theoretical models have made many 
scientists and nonscientists believe that it is necessary and urgent for human beings to 
change their behavior in order not to destroy the very planet they live on. However, 
there are also many people who don't hold the same views on the issue. Although the 
evidence described above is consistent with the climate models' predictions of the 
changes due to increased GHG concentrations in the atmosphere, they are also within 
the boundary of natural variations. The available evidence is not strong enough to 
confirm that these events indeed are the results of greenhouse warming rather than 
natural variations. Given the likely magnitude of the potential costs of any action 
taken to reduce GHG emissions, many people are hesitant to advocate or to make 
immediate policy responses. Some suggest (as advocated by the U.S. government 
during the Bush administration) that it might be beneficial to wait another decade or 
so before we commit a large amount of resources to emission reduction reiated 
investments. Others believe that there are too many other obvious and serious 
environmental problems, and that we can much better utilize available resources 
solving these problems. 
16 
The key problem here is uncertainty. It is unlikely for people to be convinced 
that it is necessary and urgent to make a commitment to the cause of emission control 
or abatement without knowing clearly that, if we do not change our behavior now, the 
temperature will surely rise, climate change will surely come, and the change will 
surely cause severe damages to our lives. 
While most people agree that there is much research concerning global climate 
change that needs to be done, some precautionary actions may be needed now to 
reduce the possibility of climate change before it is too late. Human lives may be too 
valuable to be put at unknown risk of irreversible damages, and so also may be the 
natural ecosystems associated with various plant and animal species. 
Potential Impacts of Global Warming and Climate Change 
When assessing the impacts of climate change .on economic activities, the most 
commonly used benchmark is the doubling of carbon dioxide equivalent in the 
atmosphere relative to the preindustrial level. It is estimated by the IPCC that, when 
the doubling of carbon dioxide equivalent is reached, the global mean temperature on 
average would increase l .5-4.5°C, with the best guess of 2.5°C. This would be a 
global mean surface temperature unprecedented in human history. By 1986, the carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere was already 25 percent higher than the preindustrial level. 
The doubling of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is expected to be reached before the 
middle of the next century. 
It is expected that most of the warming would happen in the high latitudes, 
especially in the northern polar region. The northern polar surface temperature may 
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increase 2-3 times more than the global average increase, which imposes a great threat 
of the melting of the ice sheet and ice caps in that region. Global warming may 
increase sea levels in two ways: through the thermal expansion of ocean water, and 
through the shrinking of ice caps and mountain glaciers. IPCC expects the sea level to 
rise about 65 cm from the current level by the year 2100 if no action is taken to abate 
GHG emissions. Warmer air increases evaporation, and a warmer atmosphere is able 
to hold more moisture longer, thus the frequency of heavy rainfall in very short period 
(i.e. one-day downpours of 2 inches or more) increases. Since the frequency of 
hurricanes is closely and exponentially related to the area of the ocean with a 
temperature over 26.8°C, when the oceans are warmer, more hurricanes are likely. 
Taking into consideration the feedback processes of the climatic system, the 
effects of global warming may be even more serious. At higher temperatures, more 
methane (a GHG) will be released faster from the ocean sediments. Oceans may also 
not have as much capacity to absorb carbon dioxide when they become warmer. If the 
assumption of continuity is not true, climate changes may come in sudden jumps 
rather than gradual transitions, leaving little time for people to react or adapt. These 
surprises may be catastrophic and the damages significantly larger. 
With business as usual, the emissions and accumulations of GHGs may cause a 
5°C increase in global mean temperature by the end of the next century, which would 
mean a 0.8°C increase in the mean temperature per decade. At this speed, there may 
be extreme shifts in the temperature at high latitudes, more rain in the wet tropics, and 
a sea level rise of 1.5 meters by the middle of next century (World Resource Institute, 
1990, p.15). Historically, a 5°C increase in the global mean temperature occurred 
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15,000 - 5,000 years ago and it was accompanied by a 100 meter rise in sea level, the 
migration of forest species over thousands of kilometers, radically altered habitats, 
species evolution and extinction, and other catastrophic environmental changes 
(Leggett, 1990, p.58). 
A rise in the sea level would threaten low lying coastal areas and small islands. 
If the sea level rises as predicted by the IPCC, it would put millions of people and 
millions of square kilometers of land at risk. The most vulnerable areas would be the 
unprotected, densely populated and economically productive coastal regions of 
countries with poor financial and techriological· resources. Tourist beaches, cultural and 
historical sites, fishing centers and other areas of special value would all be at risk. 
Valuable wetlands and lowlands may be destroy~d. Coastal structures may be 
damaged. Groundwater in the coastal areas would become more saline and coastal 
farming may face the triple threat of inundation, freshwater shortage, and salt damage. 
Warmer water and a resulting increase in humidity over the oceans might even 
encourage tropical cyclones, making damages caused by more frequent floods and 
storms even worse. Plant and animal species may suffer serious losses, along with 
damages to wetlands which are critical to biodiversity and to the life-cycles of many 
species. 
Species losses may also happen during the poleward migration of forests, when 
tropical forests increase and temperate and boreal forests decline as a result of changes 
in temperature, precipitation, soil moisture, and heat stress (Leggett, 1990) . Changes 
that affect the forest industry would also affect the agricultural sector. Besides the 
damages from inundated farmland and saltier groundwater related to sea level rising, 
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extreme whether events, shifting climate zones and changes in soil moisture may cause 
further losses in agriculture. Although some researchers suggest that the fertilization 
effect of carbon dioxide and longer growing seasons in the northern areas may 
increase agricultural production, the unfavorable changes in heat stress, soil moisture, 
and less time for plant development before maturity would reduce yields in many 
other regions. Also, the fertilization effect is more significant for the mid-latitude food 
staples, such as wheat, rice, and soy beans, but not so for low-latitude crops such as 
maize, sorghum, sugar-cane, millet, and many pasture and forage grasses. Poor soil in 
the north may also offset some of the benefit from the fertilization effect of the mid-
latitude crops. 
The fertilization effect would require ample water to be effective (Leggett, 
1990). However, even without climate change, there have been increasingly serious 
problems with water supply in many areas. Demand for water increasingly exceeds 
local supplies in many regions. Water pollution and poor irrigation practices put even 
greater pressure on water resources. With global warming, precipitation is expected to 
rise in some areas and fall in others, but the evaporation rate would be higher and 
snow accumulation would be less everywhere. These would both result in a reduction 
in river run-off. Large variations in precipitation from year to year and an increase in 
extreme events such as droughts and floods would cause critical problems in the 
reliability of water sources. As the water supply is reduced, there may not be enough 
freshwater or groundwater suitable for household and agricultural use in some areas. 
Croplands, forests, and other ecosystems may be damaged. Falling water levels would 
also require adjustments in urban settlement, upgrading of water storage 
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infrastructure, and the implementation of public policies on water usage and waste 
control. 
Other economic sectors may also be affected. Tourism may decrease because of 
very high temperatures in the low latitude areas and warmer winters with less snow 
accumulation in the high latitude areas. Neither very hot days nor very heavy rains are 
favorable for the construction sector. The increase in demand for electricity for cooling 
is expected to exceed the reduction in the demand for electricity for heating, leading to 
a overall higher demand for and spending on energy. Serious stress may be put on 
urban structures such as reservoirs, storm sewers, canal controls, drainage systems, 
dams, etc .. Discomfort from the very hot and longer summers, in addition to sea level 
rising, may increase migration and increase pressure on capacity in the host areas. 
Longer and warmer summers may also increase heat-stress-related illness and other 
diseases caused by increased pollution. 
Abatement Options and Policy Implications 
With the knowledge that global warming is mainly caused by the increase in 
the emission and accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere, the suggested abatement 
actions primarily focus on reduction of these emissions. The most cost-effective way 
to reduce emissions is by improving energy efficiency. Cline (1992) and others, 
estimate that GHG emissions may be reduced by about 20% of the 1990 level at zero 
cost through many engineering approaches. Window glazing, weather stripping, better 
insulation and more efficient cooling and heating systems could significantly reduce 
electricity use in residential and commercial buildings. Even replacing incandescent 
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light bulbs with fluorescent bulbs saves significant lighting energy. More fuel-efficient 
car and airplane engines, together with mass transportation systems, car pooling and 
other means of transportation, could reduce energy demand and hence fossil fuel 
burning. Technological innovation and improvement and international information 
exchange could enable manufacturing industries to produce more goods per unit of 
energy used. 
Although some of these approaches do suggest easy and inexpensive energy 
saving tips, such as weather stripping and car pooling, others may involve more 
complicated and high cost processes. Research and technology innovation are needed 
to develop and adopt many energy saving options, such as more efficient heating and 
cooling systems, fuel saving motor engines, and more energy efficient buildings. It 
would take even more effort and resources to find more efficient technologies for 
manufacturing processes. 
Another way to reduce atmospheric GHG accumulations is to switch away 
from GHG emitting processes and products. The first step of the switch is to phase out 
CFC-11 and CFC-12, and replace them with safer CFCs. CFCs have many industrial 
uses, as blowing agents in packing materials and other plastic foams, as solvents for 
cleaning electronic circuits, and as the coolants in refrigerators and air-conditioners. 
CFCs account for smaller share than does carbon dioxide of the total GHG 
accumulations in the atmosphere. However, the radiative forcing per unit of mass 
change (molecule) from CFCs is 4,000-20,000 times more than carbon dioxide, and it 
stays in the atmosphere for 60-130 years (Cline, 1992). Another danger of CFCs is 
that they deplete the ozone layer and allow ultra violet rays to come close to the earth 
22 
creating a great health risk. Since the 1987 Montreal Protocol, many new forms of 
CFCs have been developed and used in place of CFC-11 and CFC-12. These new 
forms of CFCs are believed to be easier to break down and they stay in the 
atmosphere for much shorter times, thus causing less serious damage to the ozone 
layer and trapping less radiation. 
Given the large share of carbon dioxide in the accumulated GHGs, the major 
attention of fuel switching to reduce emissions is focused on replacing high carbon 
fuels with lower carbon fuels, such as replacing coal with oil or natural gas. To 
produce the same amount of energy, coal emits 1.5 times more carbon dioxide than oil 
and twice as much as natural gas. However, natural gas has a much higher 
concentration of methane, another GHG that traps more heat than carbon dioxide per 
unit. A even better or cleaner choice of fuel would be hydrogen, which may be 
obtained by passing electricity through water to split it into hydrogen and oxygen, 
although the current cost of producing hydrogen this way is too high, primarily 
because of high electricity costs (World Resources Institute, 1990). 
Since fossil fuel burning is a major source of carbon dioxide and other GHG 
emissions, switching toward energy sources that do not involve fossil fuel burning 
would reduce emissions dramatically. Non-fossil-burning sources include hydro, solar, 
wind, biomass, and nuclear energy. With currently available technology, these energy 
sources may be used either to partially replace fossil fuels in some sectors, or to 
completely replace fossil fuels in some applications. Solar energy may be used for 
water heating, pool heating, space cooling or heating. It can also be used to provide 
heat for industrial processes, to meet building energy needs, and to generate electricity. 
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Biomass is another source of thermal energy. It can also be transferred into liquid or 
gaseous fuels. Wind, hydro, and nuclear energy can all be used to generate thermal 
capacity or electricity. 
Deforestation is another major source of man-made carbon dioxide emissions. 
Therefore, to reduce emissi(?nS, deforestation could be reduced and/or afforestation 
could to be increased. These options constitute the forestation approach of emission 
abatement. 
Also, since emissions are closely related to energy consumption, which in turn 
is directly related to the size of the population, it may be important to control 
population growth if emissions are to be limited. Uncontrolled population growth may 
also contribute to carbon dioxide emissions through human respiration. Zhuang and 
Zhai (1991) estimated that each person produces 0.07tons of carbon per year. With a 
total world population of 5.7 billion in 1995, this source accounts for about 400 
million tons of carbon per year. 
Government policies can play an important role in many areas to provide 
incentives for emissions reduction. Policies can be directed to support and sponsor 
research in the development of better materials, techniques, and more efficient systems 
and technologies. Taxes and other regulations may be used to steer energy-users away 
from high GHG content fossil fuels to lower content fuels or to non-fossil fuel 
renewable energy sources. Population policy could also play a critical part in 





Geography and Climate China is located in Eastern Asia, with the Pacific 
ocean on its east and southeast. It stretches in latitude from 3°N (Nan Sha Islands) to 
54°N at the border of Helongjiang Province with the former Soviet Union. Even when 
the southern islands are not included, the mainland of the country still covers 36° in 
latitude, from 18°N at Hainan province northward, a stretch of about 4,400 km (2,750 
miles). The west-east distance is about 4,500 km, starting from 71 °E in longitude at 
the western most point between Xinjiang Autonomous Region and the former Soviet 
Union in the west, and going to 135°E at the Ussuri River bordering Helongjiang 
province and the former Soviet Union in the east (Manfred and Peng, 1988). 
Because of its latitudinal position, China is mostly a mid-latitude subcontinent 
with mainly temperate climate and certain subtropical areas. However, the geographic 
location and landform of the country makes China's climate a much more 
complicated system. 
Facing the Pacific ocean on the east while the other three sides are 
encompassed by continental Asia, China presents a sharply contrasting and highly 
diversified surface configuration. There are three natural steps determined by elevation. 
On the southwest side is the highest step known as the "roof of the earth", which 
consists of the gigantic Qinghai-Xizang (Tibetan) Plateau. Going north and eastward, 
the medium step in altitude is mainly formed by vast plateaus and enormous intra-
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Mountain basins. The third step is on the east side with plains and lowlands and 
thousands of islands. 
Combining the impacts of latitude, longitude, and landform on the climate 
system, China has a temperature distribution system that exhibits large variations with 
respect to both latitude and longitude (see figure 2.1 on page 27). The total annual 
precipitation distribution is also extremely variable, as shown in figure 2.2 (page 28). 
Following the northwest-southeast gradient, the country may be roughly divided into 
two parts, with the west part dry and warmer, and the east side relatively wet and 
cooler. However, the large variations in temperature and precipitation allow numerous 
combinations of the two, thus all five. climate types defined by the Koppen 
classification system are present in China (see figure 2.3 on page 29 and table 2.1 on 
page 30 for details). 
Natural Resources. Population. and the Environment China is ranked the 
second largest country in the world with a land area of more than 9.6 million square 
kilo-meters, and another 4. 73 million km2 of sea surface. The country is surpassed in 
size only by Canada after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. With more 
than 5,400 islands, its island coastline comes to a total of 14,000 kilometers, while the 
length of its mainland shore extends more than 18,000 kilometers. 
The official estimate of cultivated land in 1993 was 95.1 million hectare, which 
is less than 10 percent of its total land area. There is another 108 million hectare of 
undeveloped land, with about 35.35 million hectare ara,ble. Forests cover 128.63 
million hectare, or 13.4 percent of the country. Mountains and plateaus with elevation 
of 1000 meters and above make up 60 percent of the total area of the country. The 
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Figure 2.1 Mean Annual Air Temperature Distribution of China 
-----· =-°'/0""' 
Source: Manfred and Peng, 1988, p. 78. 
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Figure 2.2 Mean Annual Precipitation Distribution of China 
o._ _____ 1000 .... 
Source: Manfred and Peng, 1988, p.140. 
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Table 2.1 Koppen Climate Classification System 
Letter Symbol Explanation 
A Average temperature of coolest month l 8°C or higher 
f Precipitation in driest month at least 60mm 
m (100-r)/25 ::s; Precipitation in driest month< less than 60mm 
w Precipitation in driest month less than (100 -r)/25 
B 70% or more annual precipitation falls in the warmer 6 months 
(April to September in the northern hemisphere) and r/10 less 
than2t+28 
70% or more annual precipitation falls in the cooler 6 months 
(October to March in the northern hemisphere) and r/10 less than 
2t 
Neither half of the year with more than 70% annual precipitation 
and r/10 less than 2t+ 14 
w r less than one half of the upper limit of applicable requirement 
s forB 
r less than upper limit for B, but more than one 'half of that 
amount 
C Average temperature of warmest month greater than 10°C and of 
coldest month between 18° and 0°C 
s precipitation in driest month of the summer half of the year less 
than one-tenth of the wettest summer month 
w Precipitation in wettest month of the summer half of the year 
more than 10 times of driest month of winter half 
f Precipitation does not meet conditions of either s or w 
D Average temperature of warmest month greater than 10°C and of 
coldest month 0°C or below 
s Same as under C 
w Same as under C 
f Same as under C 
E Average temperature of warmest month below 10°C 
T Average temperature of warmest month between 10° and 0°C 
F Average temperature of warmest month 0°C or below 
Source: Manfred and Peng, 1988, p. 234. 
Note: In the formula, t is the average annual temperature in °C, the average annual 
precipitation is in mm. 
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country has more than 1000 billion tons of coal reserves, more than 48.7 billion tons 
of iron ore, and some amount of many other minerals. Surface water resource is 
estimated at a total of more than 2,800 billion cubic meters. (China Statistical 
Yearbook, 1994) 
China has always been a populous country. During the first two decades of the 
People's Republic, population growth was astonishing. In 1949, the year of the 
establishment of the People's Republic, total population of the country was about 540 
million. Although population control efforts started in the early 1970s and became 
very rigid in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the fast population growth in the decades 
of 1950s and 1960s led to the doubling of the already large population in just over 
three decades. By 1982, the country's population surpassed the 1 billion mark. Its 
current population of more than 1.2 billion makes up one fifth of the world's total. It 
is projected that by the year 2000, China's population will be more than 1.25 billion 
(see tables 2.2 and 2.3 on pages 32-33 for population statistics and projections). 
Dividing the available resources by the huge population, per capita resources 
become trivial, especially in the case of energy. In 1992, annual per capita electricity 
consumption was 54.6 kwh, with annual per capita energy consumption of 133.4 kg of 
standard coal. Lu (1989) estimated that even with very fast economic growth, China's 
per capita energy consumption in 100 years would come to only 1/5 of the level 
enjoyed by people in the US today. In areas where coal is not abundantly available 
and hydropower is not reliable, people depend heavily on biomass to bring heat and 
light. Deforestation becomes a means of living. In the rural areas of Yunnan Province, 
as in other regions of china, during the dry seasons when hydro-power is not available, 
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Table 2.2 China's Population: millions 
China's Population 
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Table 2.3 Population Projections 
China World 
Year high medium low high medium low 
1995 1244.16 1238.32 1231.99 5782.60 5759.28 5731.30 
2000 1327.10 1309.74 1290.76 6300.58 6228.25 6150.79 
2005 1395.40 1361.83 1325.16 6828.91 6688.16 6540.67 
2010 1456.17 1409.95 1355.61 7368.84 7149.50 6916.42 
2015 1519.43 1458.44 1384.43 7927.80 7608.97 7270.62 
2020 1583.89 1504.18 1407.22 8498.18 8049.92 7581.03 
2025 1642.23 1539.76 1417.07 9079.69 8472.45 7851.92 
2050 1.52 12.5 10.0 7.8 
2100 1.41 19.2 11.2 6.0 
Sources: 
1. 1995-2025: in millions, World Population Prospects, the 1992 Revision, Department 
for Economics and Social Information and Policy Analysis, united Nations, 1993. 
2. 2050-2150: in billions, McNicoll, 1992. 
Note: 
Assumptions for total fertility rates are: high: 2.5; medium: 2.06; and low: 1.70. 
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people can afford only two hours of electricity every day. There are situations when 
people are rich enough to buy refrigerators and washers, only to use them as cabinets 
and storage spaces because of a shortage of electricity. 1 
With 20 percent of the world population, China has 7 percent of world's land 
area, and only 10 percent of it is cultivable. The increase in population has put serious 
pressure on food production, yet cultivated land area has been declining for various 
reasons, such as increased land needed for housing, industrial and urban expansion, 
extension of transportation links, construction of irrigation and power generation 
reservoirs, and natural degradation caused by heavy erosion, desertification and 
salinization. 
North China has 60 percent of the country's area but only 20 percent of its 
water resources. Cities like Beijing, Tianjin, and some provincial capitals, experience 
serious water shortages all the time. Residential water supply may be rationed to 
different areas at different hours of the day even in provincial capital cities such as 
Taiyuan in Shanxi Province. Even in the southern part of the country where water is 
relatively abundant, underground water is constantly over-exploited. The water table of 
the entire region has dropped to 30, 40, in some areas even 70 meters below ground, 
causing land sinking problems, in cities such as Shanghai.2 
The large and fast growing population, limited land and water resources, and 
the desperate need for energy results in activities that cause serious damage to the 
environment. Deforestation, the destruction of natural vegetation, the conversion of 
1 Personal contact with Yunnan delegation on Biomass-To-Electricity project sponsored 
by Joint Institute of Energy and Environment, University of Tennessee at Knoxville. 
2 For detailed discussion of China's environment, see Vaclav Smil, China's 
Environmental Crisis, 1993, and The Bad Earth by the same author, 1983. 
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lakes to cultivable land, and other activities have led to "further damages of vegetation 
cover, destruction of ecosystems, erosion, aggravation of natural disasters, shortage of 
fuel, feed, and fertilizer, exacerbation of production problems, and difficulties in 
increasing food production". 3 
Economy. Ener2:y, and Emissions Since the end of the 1970s, after China 
finally tore down the walls that had isolated the country from the rest of the world for 
about 30 years, the country has strived for fast growth in every sector of the economy. 
GDP has been increasing at double digit growth rates in most .of the years since 1978, 
and it is expected to grow at a rate higher thari most of the countries in the world for 
several decades to come (see table 2.4 on page 36 for growth rate of real GDP, 
agricultural, and industrial sectors). 
Fast growth of population and the economy requires fast growth of the energy 
industry. Because of the limited availability of other energy resources and the 
abundance of coal reserves in the country, China's economic development plan is 
based on coal as the major energy source, and this situation will not change in the 
near future. China has the largest coal reserves in the world. Coal makes up more than 
70 percent of its total energy production and consumption. Since 1989, China has been 
the number one coal producer in the world. Annual production that year passed the 1 
billion tons milestone (see tables 2.5 and 2.6 on pages 37 and 38). Still, the demand 
for energy outweighs production capacity. Since 1993, China has been a net importer 
of oil, and oil imports have been rising. 
3 Fu, Lixue, et al, Improving the Environment, Academic Publisher, in Chinese, Beijing, 
1989, p. 215. 
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Table 2.4 China's Economic Growth 1978-1994 
GDP Agriculture 
growth share in 
year value rate(%) value GDP 
1978 358.81 11.70 101.84 0.28 
1980 447.00 7.90 135.94 0.30 
1983 578.70 10.20 196.08 0.34 
1984 692.82 14.50 229.55 0.33 
1985 852.74 12.90 254.16 0.30 
1986 968.76 8.50 276.39 0.29 
1987 1130.71 11.10 320.43 0.28 
1988 1407.42 11.30 383.10 0.27 
1989 1599.76 4.30 422.80 0.26 
1990 1768.13 3.90 501.70 0.28 
1991 2018.83 8.00 528.86 0.26 
1992 2436.29 13.60 580.00 0.24 
1993 3128.03 13.40 665.00 0.21 
1994 4380.00 11.80 823.10 0.19 
1995 5773.30 10.20 1136.50 0.20. 
Sources: 
1994: People's Daily, March 2, 1995. 
1995: People's Daily, March 5, 1996. 
Rest: China Statistical Yearbook, 1994. 
Notes: 


















2. Growth rates are over preceding years based on comparable prices. 
3. Share in GDP are calculated from data in values. 
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Table 2.5 China's Energy Sector: Production and Consumption 
Production 
year total growth rate elasticity 
1978 627.70 
1979 645.62 2.9 
1980 637.35 - 1.3 
1981 632.27 - 0.8 
1982 667.78 5.6 
1983 712.70 6.7 0.66 
1984 778.55 9.2 0.64 
1985 855.46 9.9 0.77 
1986 881.24 3.0 0.35 
1987 912.66 3.6 0.32 
1988 958.01 5.0 0.44 
1989 1016.39 6.1 1.42 
1990 1039.22 2.2 0.58 
1991 1048.44 0.9 0.11 
1992 1072.56 2.3 0.17 
1993 1112.63 3.7 0.28 
1994 1120.00 4.7 0.40 
Source: 
1994: People's Daily, March 2, 1995. 
Rest: China Statistical Yearbook, 1994. 
Notes: 
Consumption 





























1. Total energy production and consumption are in million tons of standard coal. 
2. Growth rates are over preceding year. 
3. Elasticity = annual growth rate in energy I annual growth rate in GDP. 
4. 1994 uses 10 kwh = 1.229 tons of standard coal equivalent to convert electric power 
into SCE. Other years uses 10 kwh = 4.04 tons of SCE. (A 70% improvement in 
efficiency?) 
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Table 2.6 China's Energy Components 
Share in Energy Production 
Raw Coal Raw Crude Natural 
year production Coal Oil Gas 
1978 618 70.3 23.7 2.9 
1979 635 70.2 23.5 3 
1980 620.15 69.4 23.8 3 
1981 621.64 70.2 22.9 2.7 
1982 666.33 71.3 21.8 2.4 
1983 714.53 71.6 21.3 2.3 
1984 789.23 72.4 21.0 2.1 
1985 872.28 72.8 20.9 2.0 
1986 894.04 72.4 21.2 2.1 
1987 928.08 72.6 21.0 2.0 
1988 979.88 73.1 20.4 2.0 
1989 1054.14 74.1 19.3 2.0 
1990 1079.88 74.2 19.0 2.0 
1991 1087.41 74.1 19.2 2.0 
1992 1116.38 74.3 18.9 2.0 
1993 73.8 18.6 2.0 
Sources: 
China Statistical yearbook, 1993 and 1994. 
Note: 
Raw coal production is in million tons. 




















Share in Energy Consumption 
Raw Crude Natural Hydro-
Coal Oil Gas Power 
70.7 22.7 3.2 3.4 
71.3 21.8 3.3 3.6 
72.2 20.7 3.1 4.0 
72.7 20.0 2.8 4.5 
73.7 18.9 2.5 4.9 
74.2 18.1 2.4 5.3 
75.3 17.4 2.4 4.9 
75.8 17.1 2.2 4.9 
75.8 17.2 2.3 4.7 
76.2 17.0 2.1 4.7 
76.2 17.0 2.1 4.7 
76.0 17.1 2.0 4.9 
76.2 16.6 2.1 5.1 
76.1 17.1 2.0 4.8 
75.7 17.5 1.9 4.9 
72.8 19.6 2.0 5.6 
As Lu (1991) pointed out, China has considerable potential to develop non-
carbon sources, such as hydropower and nuclear energy. Currently, China is utilizing 
only 6 percent of its hydro potential, and there is no public hostility against nuclear 
energy development. However, there are various drawbacks and obstacles to exploiting 
these energy sources. For hydropower, the capital requirement is generally 50 percent 
higher than for fossil-fuel power plants, and there are more direct environmental 
impacts involved in the development of hydropower projects, such as the inundation of 
large areas of arable land, the relocation of millions of people, and the obvious 
disruption of the ecosystem. Besides, more than 25 percent of China's hydro sources 
are in the remote Tibet Plateau, and exploiting these resources would require the 
construction of long-distance ultra-high voltage transmission lines which require 
additional investment. 
In the case of nuclear energy, an absolute safety guarantee is required if China 
is to rely on nuclear energy on a large scale. Given the magnitude of energy 
consumption, a small amount of nuclear energy will not solve the problem of GHG 
emissions from fossil fuel burning, but large scale nuclear energy imposes a serious 
safety threat to the public. Also, since nuclear power plants cost 50-100 percent more 
than conventional fossil-fuel plants, it is not economically sound to replace fossil-fuel 
plants with nuclear plants when there is a capital shortage. 
Based on the availability of other energy sources and limitation on capital and 
technology, although China has the potential to exploit non-carbon energy sources, in 
the near future, coal will probably remain the major source of energy. Lu (1991) 
projects that, even by 2050, more than 50 percent of China's energy demand will 
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continue to be satisfied by coal, with coal's share in energy consumption ranging 
from 50-70 percent depending on the scale of nuclear energy. 
China already faces various serious environmental problems or, as Smil (1993) 
claimed, environmental crises, such as a shortage of water resources, desertification, 
soil erosion, acid rain, and air and water pollution. All of these problems are 
exacerbated by the huge population and large scale fossil fuel burning. The high 
demand for energy and the inefficient use of energy resources makes China one of the 
major contributors to world carbon emissions. Its carbon emissions in 1992 reached 
728 million tons, which makes up about 12 percent of the world total (table 2.7 on 
page 41 ). The lack of other energy sources makes it impossible for China to reduce its 
GHG emissions significantly in the near future. Given the expected fast growth of the 
economy and a heavy dependence on coal as an energy source, China's carbon 
emissions are expected to increase still faster unless the country makes a commitment 
to carbon emission reductions through efficiency improvements and various policies. 
Potential Impacts of Global Warming on China 
The huge population of China is unevenly distributed, with over 90 percent of 
it occupying 43 percent of the land area concentrated in the southeast and east regions 
since a large part of the west and northwest is mountains or deserts that are less 
suitable for inhabitation. The agricultural sector still makes up about 20 percent of the 
economy and depends very much on natural climate conditions. In recent years, the 
coastal regions has been the site of the most advanced and fast growing economic 
zones, cities, ports, and other important facilities· and structures. 
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Table 2.7 CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel Burning and Cement Production: 1950-1992 
China USA world 
year total per capita total per capita total per capita 
1950 21,713 0.04 696,069 4.57 1,638 0.65 
1951 28,083 0.05 716,717 4.63 1,775 0.69 
1952 35,396 0.06 697,920 4.44 1,803 0.69 
1953 37,016 0.06 714,462 4.46 1,848 0.70 
1954 44,508 0.08 680,491 4.18 1,871 0.69 
1955 52,683 0.09 745,973 4.50 2,050 0.74 
1956 59,702 0.10 781,912 4.63 2,185 0.78 
1957 70,742 0.11 775,115 4.51 2,278 0.80 
1958 145,012 0.23 750,766 4.29 2,338 0.80 
1959 199,043 0.31 781,360 4.40 2,471 0.83 
1960 215,259 0.33 799,544 4.43 2,586 0.86 
1961 152,218 0.23 801,875 4.37 2,602 0.85 
1962 121,402 0.18 831,489 4.46 2,708 0.86 
1963 120,384 0.18 875,633 4.63 2,855 0.89 
1964 120,432 0.17 912,912 4.76 3,016 0.92 
1965 131,182 0.18 948,264 4.88 3,154 0.95 
1966 144,066 0.20 999,673 5.08 3,314 0.97 
1967 119,369 0.16 1,039,174 5.23 3,420 0.98 
1968 129,195 0.17 1,080,969 5.38 3,596 1.01 
1969 159,014 0.20 1,132,028 5.58 3,809 1.05 
1970 211,607 0.26 1,165,477 5.68 4,084 1.10 
1971 240,461 0.29 1,173,242 5.66 4,235 1.12 
1972 255,513 0.30 1,227,346 5.86 4,403 1.14 
1973 265,676 0.30 1,275,365 6.03 4,641 1.18 
1974 270,967 0.30 1,231,098 5.76 4,649 1.16 
1975 314,304 0.34 1,179,027 5.46 4,622 1.13 
1976 328,181 0.35 1,262,745 5.78 4,889 1.18 
1977 366,184 0.39 1,270,549 5.76 5,028 1.19 
1978 407,398 0.43 1,293,945 5.80 5,076 1.18 
1979 416,244 0.43 1,303,822 5.78 5,358 1.23 
1980 406,440 0.42 1,236,297 5.43 5,290 1.19 
1981 402,598 0.41 1,195,706 5.20 5,119 1.13 
1982 431,541 0.43 1,139,230 4.91 5,080 1.10 
1983 455,215 0.45 1,143,714 4.88 5,070 1.08 
1984 494,786 0.48 1,184,227 5.01 5,242 1.10 
1985 536,666 0.51 1,202,453 5.04 5,417 1.12 
1986 564,391 0.53 1,224,096 5.09 5,609 1.14 
1987 602,467 0.56 1,268,062 5.22 5,736 1.14 
1988 646,047 0.59 1,340,168 5.47 5,961 1.17 
1989 657,086 0.59 1,347,634 5.44 6,070 1.17 
1990 660,726 0.58 1,322,212 5.29 6,099 1.15 
1991 694,154 0.60 1,317,297 5.22 6,172 1.15 
1992 728,161 0.62 1,332,246 5.22 6,097 1.12 
Source: Gregg Marland, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 
1. Carbon dioxide emissions for the world are expressed in million metric tons of carbon 
2. Emissions for individual countries are expressed in thousand metric tons of carbon 
3. Annual per capita estimates are expressed in metric tons of carbon per person 
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The IPCC projected that atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration will be 
double the preindustrial level by 2030, that the global average temperature by then will 
rise by, 1-2°C, and that the sea level will rise 20 cm compared to 1990 levels. Basedon 
these projections, China's scientists have done many studies of the impacts of 
climate change on the economy. Among these are studies by Peng (1991) and 
Ren(1990) focusing on the impacts of climate on China's environment. Xia (1991) 
studied the Chinese population-environment relationship and the climate impacts. 
In a paper published as proceedings of a workshop in Austria in 1993, Xia and 
Wei summarized the impacts of climate change on China in the following terms: 
Agriculture The positive impact of global warming is mainly from the longer 
growing season in the northern regions due to higher temperatures. However, higher 
temperature also increases evaporation, resulting in drier winters and more arid 
summers. The shortage of water resources will be worsened in most regions, which 
will negatively affect agricultural activities, as well as reduce the benefits of the 
fertilization effect of carbon. Soil erosion, salinization, and land degradation will 
continue to cause losses of cultivated land. In general, climate change will reduce 
agricultural production in China by at least 5 percent (See table 2.8 on page 43 for 
details). 
Water Resources China has the least water resource per capita of all major 
countries in the world. While its population makes up one fifth of the world total, its 
freshwater accounts for only 5 percent of the world's total volume. The uneven 
distribution of water resources causes other related problems, such as frequent floods 
and droughts. Global warming and climate change is expected to seriously affect 
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Table 2.8 Impact of Climate Change on China's Af¢culture 
Higher Impacts on Output 
Temperature 
Southwestern 3°C or more average effective ag: increase by 2% (8 million 
Northwestern 3°C or more growmg season tons) southeast: 4 million tons, 
Other 2-3°C increases by one northeast: 1 million tons, 
nionth south: 1 million tons or more, 
also increases productivity of 
biomass and economic crops. 
Evaporation 
mid-latitude increase 20% 13 million ha of 
(north and (300-400 mm) cultivated land lost 
northwest) 
west 9 million ha of 




north, west, drought damage increases by 5%, 
mid-north •. 4 million tons of lost output 
(wheat) 
Summer: 
south rice output reduced by 20% 
( 6 million tons) 
Autumn: 
west grain output reduced by 20% 
( 4 million tons) 
north grain output reduced by 5 % 
pest control increase by 10-15% 
cost 
Total Impact: at least 5% reduction in ag output 
Source: Xia and Wei, 1993. 
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precipitation, river run-off, and groundwater levels, especially in the central and 
eastern part of the country, where water supply is already in severe shortage. 
As shown in table 2.8, global warming is expected to increase evaporation in 
north and northwest China by 30-40 percent. This is already an arid and semi-arid 
region. The Yellow River is the principle stream in this region. However, it can 
provide only one-fourth of the water per hectare of cultivated land as compared to the 
Yangtze River area in the south. During the dry season in the 1980s, its runoff 
dropped to- two-fifth of its normal average, causing serious reductions in crop yields, 
disruption of industrial production, and enormous difficulties in urban living. A 
reduction in runoff necessitates heavy reliance on underground water reserves. 
Excessive pumping causes surface subsidence that affects virtually every major city in 
the north. In addition, soil erosion has always been such a serious problem in the 
Yellow River region that the river's silt load has beenincreasing the average river 
bed by 1 meter per decade. While an increase in evaporation and a decrease in 
precipitation in this region may cause more severe water shortage and drought 
damages, the increased intensity of rainfall coming as one-day downpours will cause 
river flooding that may affect most densely populated areas along the ·river. 
Although water resources have been relatively abundant in the south, such as in 
the Yangtze valley, this region faces .the same problem as the north of erosion and 
silting. Increased silting raises river beds and causes the disappearance of some lakes, 
reducing the natural flood-storage capacity. This region is densely populated and 
economically more advanced. If global warming increases precipitation intensity as 
predicted for this region, larger flooding damages may affect many people. 
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Sea Level Rise The southeastern coast of China is the most developed 
industrial and agricultural area, with many seawater breeding farms that are the most 
important non-staple food base for the coastal cities, the fertile river delta farmlands 
that are important grain production bases, and industrial and economic centers that 
have been the driving force for China's recent economic growth. A 20 cm sea level 
rise would flood or destroy most of the seawater breeding farms and half of the Pearl 
River delta would be inundated. There would be production losses, land losses, and 
damage to infrastructure. In Shanghai, the largest city and one of the most advanced 
areas of China, the business district is crowded· with high buildings along the Huangpu 
River and the world's highest building is to be put up in the next few years. However, 
the average elevation of the city: is only 1.8 meters above sea level. If the sea level . 
rises as predicted, damages to. the city and other similar areas would be tremendous. A 
higher warming rate in the summer would increase the frequency and intensity of 
typhoons that affect many coastal areas in China. 
~ Leggett (1990) cited a study sponsored by the Chinese 
government. The study found that reductions in soil moisture would produce large 
reductions in major tree species. Four of the six principle timber species in China 
would be severely affected or decimated. 
China's Participation in Research on Global Climate Change 
As in other countries, the issues of global environmental and climate change 
have engaged members of the scientific community in China. As a result, a policy 
approach to global change issues is evolving. In 1991, China signed the Montreal 
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Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layers and Chinese scientists are 
researching and developing CFC-alternative technologies. Governmental support for 
other global change scientific research is also emerging. 
In the area of global warming, China, like other developing countries, believes 
that wealthy industrialized nations should help finance developing countries' 
participation in addressing the problem. Chinese research on the global warming issue 
has a definite national focus. It is focused primarily on the possible impact of climate 
change on the country's prospects for economic development and on its existing 
problems such as deforestation, soil erosion, and soil degradation. China has also 
emphasized studies of historical changes and land use problems. 
China has been involved in two major international global change programs 
since their early stages: the International Geosphere-Biosphere Program (IGBP) 
sponsored by the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), and the World 
Climate Research Program (WCRP) jointly sponsored by ICSU and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO). China also participates in and cooperates with 
many other international global change projects, such as the International Global 
Atmospheric Chemistry Project, Global Change and Terrestrial Ecosystems, Biospheric 
Aspects of the Hydrological Cycle and Global Energy and Water Cycle Experiment, 
and Global Analysis, Interpretation, and Modeling, and others. 
One aspect of the issue that has a relatively low priority in China's global 
change research agenda is China's contribution to global environmental change. Data 
on China's biogenic and industrial emissions, for example, are not readily available. 
Given the national focus in China's research on the global change issue, it is 
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important to estimate the costs of global warming and climate change to China's 
economy, and China's benefits from emission abatement actions, so that emission 




Several studies have examined the issues of GHG emissions and possible 
climate change caused by the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere, and the 
potential impacts of climate change on economic activities. However, the results from 
these studies are far from close to each other, with the estimated GHG emissions and 
GDP losses in different regions covering a very wide range. Based on these studies 
(some of them to be reviewed below), global emissions in 2100 under the scenario of 
"business as usual" ranges from .22.5 billion tons of carbon (GtC) to 40 GtC. The 
estimated losses of GDP in 2020 range from 0.5 percent to 2 percent for OECD 
countries, 0.5 percent to 3 percent for China, and even larger for oil-producing 
developing countries. With a longer time horizon, the differences between these 
estimates are even bigger. 
One most important reason for the big differences in the estimates from these 
studies lies in the different assumptions of these models, including, among others, the 
values for parameters such as primary energy demands, relative energy prices, energy 
efficiency improvement; the degrees of substitution between fossil fuels, between 
fossil and non-fossil fuels, and between energy and other production factors; and the 
availability of carbon-free backstop technologies. The differences in results of these 
studies underscore the uncertainty that characterizes global climate change and 
associated economic impacts. They also reveal the need for further scientific and 
economic researches. 
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This chapter compares and contrasts some of the important emissions-climate-
economic consequences models. It also introduces the basic logic of Nordhaus DICE 
model and discusses the ground for modification of the DICE model to make the 
global model applicable to a one country case. 
Edmonds & Reilly Model (ERM) 
According to the manual prepared by Edmonds and Reilly (1986) to 
accompany for the PC version of their model, the ERM was originally written in 1984 
using FORTRAN IV for mainframe adaptation, then modified in 1985 for use on IBM 
personal computers. The PC version allows users to modify a total of 39 different 
major assumptions interactively from 12 categories through the use of an internal data 
editor. It provides both graphical and tabular results. These easy-to-use features make 
the model widely and frequently applied. 
The title of the model, "Long-Term Global Energy-CO2 Model", clearly 
describes the model's primary focus; i.e., how carbon emissions are related to the 
energy sector. The model mathematically integrates economic, demographic, 
technological and geological factors to make long-term projections about global energy 
consumption and carbon dioxide emissions. The time horizon is from 1975 to 2100, in 
25 year intervals. It divides the world into nine global regions, and includes six major 
energy somces. Energy demand in each region is a function of population, labor 
productivity, economic activity, technological change, energy prices, and energy taxes 
and tariffs. The supply of energy has two categories, renewable and non-renewable, 
and it is determined by resomce constraints, behavioral assumptions, and energy 
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prices. The model applies iterative price adjustments to achieve equilibrium of each 
energy market in each region within pre-specified bounds. After the energy markets 
are balanced, the carbon dioxide emissions are calculated for the regions according to 
how much gas, oil, and coal is consumed in that region. 
As a partial equilibrium energy model aimed at projecting global energy and 
carbon dioxide emissions, ERM looks at only energy markets and does not consider 
any non-energy market explicitly. The only linkage between the energy sectors and the 
entire economy is through a feedback parameter which is used to capture the 
interdependence of GNP and energy prices. This parameter is based partly on the 
notion that GNP is a proxy for the overall level of economic activity and an index of 
income, and thus an important determinant of energy demand. It is also intended to 
capture supply aspects; that is,· as energy resources are depleted, and energy prices 
rise, to keep energy production from falling, other resources are shifted away from 
other uses to energy sectors, slowing economic growth. The model allows this two-
way interaction between GNP and energy by entering the GNP that would obtain if 
energy prices remained constant at 1975 levels (a base line GNP) as a model input and 
taking the GNP that is consistent with actual energy prices in the forecast year (the 
realized GNP) as a model output. 
Although the losses in GNP due to reduced energy use ( e.g. for the purpose of 
emission reductions) may be calculated by comparing the base line GNP and the 
realized GNP, when used to estimate economic impacts of climate changes due to 
global warming caused by emission accumulations in the atmosphere, this linkage 
between emissions and GNP appears to be over-simplified. It follows only the simple 
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reasoning that to reduce emissions, energy consumption has to be reduced, therefore 
GNP has to be lowered as a result of lower energy consumption. However, this 
reasoning is not expressed as a production function process, and it does not capture the 
relations between emissions and climate changes, and between climate changes and 
other non-energy economic sectors. It cannot be used to produce reliable estimates of 
impacts of global climate change on overall economic activity. 
ERM is a global model that is intended to project energy and emissions on a 
global scale. Although the model divides the world into nine regions and results are 
reported for each region, it is not suited for forecasting emissions of individual 
countries in a defined region. For example, China is included in the Asian Centrally 
Planned Economies, one of the nine regions in the model. The ERM model cannot be 
used, however, to disaggregate the projections for the region to get estimates of 
China's emissions and the economic costs of emission reductions in China. In other 
words, disaggregation beyond the regional level is not appropriate, neither is 
disaggregation beyond the specified level of energy services. 
The ERM has been applied by many users under different assumptions for the 
values of the parameters, hence they produce different results in terms of emissions, 
GDP losses and carbon tax rates sufficient to keep emissions to a certain level. 
IEA Medium Term Energy Model (IEA) 
OECD (1993) includes IEA as one of the models that estimates costs of 
emission reductions. IEA is another partial equilibrium energy model with the 
objective of examining the trends in energy markets and carrying out sensitivity 
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analysis of the energy system. It consists of five sub-models, four of which are 
interdependent, each of which is strictly energy related, and one of which is relatively 
self-contained activity sub-model. The primary interest is to study the impact of 
carbon taxes on the global energy system. 
The final demand sub-model includes three final demand sectors 
(transportation, industry, and other, which is a combination of residential and 
commercial demand). All end-use products are energy related. There are seven oil 
products, two types of gas and electricity (industrial and other), and three coal sectors 
(industrial, coke, and other). The final demand sub-model solves for the final energy 
demand on the basis of sector activity, the end-user prices, and assumptions about 
other sector-specific variables. The result is a set of primary fuel demands. 
The supply sub-model produces a set of primary fuel supplies under various 
assumptions regarding reserves, discovery rates, and energy prices from the price sub-
mode!, plus other relevant variables. The demand for primary fuels from the final 
demand sub-model and the supply of primary fuels from the supply sub-model are 
then fed into the price sub-model. The interdependence between the price sub-model 
and both the final demand sub-model and the supply sub-model is easy to understand 
since the energy demand and supply are inputs into the price sub-model, and the prices 
are inputs into the final demand sub-model as well as the supply model. 
Another sub-model is the transformation sub-model which converts the demand 
for electricity into primary fuel demand, given the structure of the electricity 
industries, conversion efficiencies, and assumptions about non-fossil fuels. Thus, the 
total primary fuel demand is the summation of the results from the final demand sub-
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model and the transformation sub-model. The interaction between the transformation 
sub-model and the other three sub-models is through the set of primary fuel demands 
to the price sub-model, therefore to the final demand and supply sub-models. 
The one relatively self-contained sub-model is the activity sub-model which 
serves as the only linkage between the energy sectors and the macroeconomic setting. 
This sub-model converts exogenous assumptions on GDP and population into variables 
such as personal expenditure and industrial production by a non-energy sector, so that 
the assumptions about macroeconomic settings are translated into factors that have 
impacts on the sectors whose energy demand is endogenous. 
As can be seen from the basic structure of the model, the linkage between the 
energy sectors and the general economy is a very simple and limited one-way process, 
and there is no feedback from the energy sectors to the economy. This means that the 
model is not suitable for estimating the economic impacts of reductions in energy 
consumption. There is no estimate of the economic cost of carbon emission reductions. 
There is no linkage between emissions and no impacts of emission accumulations on 
other non-energy sectors through climate changes, either. 
One important feature of the IEA model is that most of the parameters are 
estimated econometrically using historical data. This feature imposes a limitation on 
the time horizon of the model. The model is designed to capture the short- and 
medium-term rigidities of energy markets. The results are reported in one year 
intervals for the period shortly after the beginning of the next century (2005). 
Although extension of the time horizon of the projections is technically possible, the 
confidence attached to the results would be very limited. 
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The econometric feature of the IEA model also imposes a limitation on its 
regional aggregation. The model divides the OECD countries into three groups (North 
America, Europe, Pacific), the former centrally planned economies into two parts (ex-
USSR and Eastern Europe), and the developing world into three continental regions 
(Africa, Asia, Latin America) and the Middle East area. China is listed as the only one 
country region. However, because of difficulties with data availability, only OECD 
countries are covered in detail in the model. The data for the other regions are much 
weaker. In the case of China, the energy system is exogenously imposed on the model, 
rather than endogenously determined. 
Global 2100 (The MR Model) 
The name of the model (Global 2100) emphasizes the global nature of the 
carbon emissions problem and implies the need tor research from a long-term 
perspective. The model covers the time span of 2000 to 2100, in 10 year intervals, 
with 1990 as the base period. This model is als.o referred to as the MR model because 
it was jointly developed by Manne and Richels (Manne and Richels, 1990b). 
The MR model is a general equilibrium model combining process analysis of 
major individual energy sources with a production function approach. Both energy and 
non-energy sectors are summarized in the model, and the discounted value of 
consumption utility is maximized over time, using nonlinear programming, subject to 
carbon constraints. An energy technology assessment (ETA) sub-model provides the 
supply side of analysis, while the other sub-model, MACRO, which is a continuously 
differentiable macroeconomic production function describing the balance of the 
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economy, determines the demands. Prices are determined so as to allow the two-way 
linkage between the ETA and MACRO sub-models. The energy supplies include both 
exhaustible resources and "backstop" technologies, with the latter available in 
unlimited quantities at constant marginal costs. For each technology, carbon emissions 
per unit of the activity level is described in the coefficients. 
The energy demands are divided into two categories, electric and non-electric. 
The economy-wide macroeconomic production function has three basic inputs: labor, 
capital, and energy. Therefore, energy demand or consumption is closely linked to 
GDP, so are carbon emissions. However, over time, due to autonomous energy 
efficiency improvement and the price-induced substitution between energy and other 
inputs, the linkage between energy/emissions and GDP may be decoupled. 
The model divides the world into five regions: USA, Other OECD Countries, 
USSR, China, and the rest of the world. A carbon emissions quota is exogenously . . 
determined for each region and can be traded on an international market. Within each 
region, supplies and demands are equilibrated for each period, but forward-looking 
features are also incorporated to allow for interactions between periods. Saving and 
investment are determined by optimization (maximization of the discounted value of 
consumption over time subject to carbon emissions constraints). 
One feature of the MR model is its attention to substitution options. There are 
five existing technologies and four future technologies for electric energy, and six 
existing and two future technologies for non-electric energy. Each energy source is 
assigned a benchmark cost, and there are many possibilities for inter-fossil-fuel 
substitutions, fossil-fuel and non-fossil-fuel substitutions. The substitution between 
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other factors and energy is explicitly modeled in the production function. Related to 
the availability of future backstop technology, the model sets an absolute limit on the 
carbon tax, since the backstop allows the emission level to be lowered without having 
to depend on higher carbon tax rates. 
As in the models mentioned above, the MR model does not include climate 
changes, and there is no parameter that links emissions to climate changes, or climate 
changes to economic activities. The linkage between emissions and GDP is through 
energy as an input. Reducing carbon dioxide emissions requires the reduction of the 
consumption of carbon rich energy, which would affect economic activities. The 
model does not include assessment of the benefits from emission reductions. 
The Recursively Dynamic Trade Model (CRTM) 
The OECD (1993) survey also includes the CRTM (Carbon Rights Trade 
Model), nicknamed for its feature of allowing the trading of carbon emissions rights. 
CR TM is a recursively dynamic general equilibrium model designed to identify the 
economic channels through which restrictions on carbon dioxide emissions affect 
international trade and the pattern of comparative advantage. The model simulates the 
economic costs and consequences of restricting carbon dioxide emissions, with special 
attention to the effects of unilateral reductions in the OECD countries. 
The CRTM is partially based on the Global 2100 model by Manne and Richels 
and has several things in common with the structure of the MR model. Both of the 
models divide the world into the same five regions, cover the same time span with the 
same time intervals, and have the same objective of maximizing discounted utility. 
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There is a process sub-model in each model that represents the energy sector. Carbon 
rights are region-specific and internationally tradeable. 
There are important differences, however, between the CRTM and the MR 
models. Unlike the MR model, CRTM is recursive rather than forward=looking, with 
savings as an input that is not affected by changes in the real interest rate. Also, the 
energy sector responds to current prices only. 
Aggregate output in CRTM is determined by three factors: the supply of 
primary factor inputs (labor and capital), the supply of "basic intermediate materials" 
(steel, plastic, chemicals, and other relatively energy-intensive goods), and the supply 
of energy resources. For each region, two traded energy goods and two non-traded 
end-use energy goods are included in an energy sub-model that describes current and 
future energy supply, with 15 alternative energy production technologies. Oil, carbon 
rights, basic intermediate materials, and other outputs are internationally traded. 
Restrictions on emissions require limitations on energy consumption, which may cause 
reductions in GDP through both direct losses from lower energy production and 
indirect losses from lower production of basic intermediate materials. 
As in the MR model, CRTM does not include climate change factors, nor does 
it assess the benefits of red~ced GHG emissions. The only linkages between emissions 
and GDP are through energy and energy-intensive goods supplies. 
Cline's Cost-Benefit Analysis 
In his 1992 book, William Cline presents an analytical survey of economic 
models of carbon reduction costs and reviews the estimates of carbon abatement costs. 
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He also considers the costs of afforestation and reduced deforestation. The economic 
damages from global warming are estimated at both the benchmarking carbon dioxide 
doubling level and at the very-long-term (250-300 years) warming level. 
The basic approach of Cline is cost-benefit analysis, with somewhat more 
emphasis on the cost side. Cline provides sectoral estimates of damages from global 
warming, for about a dozen sectors and activities listed as being climate-sensitive, 
some of which are non-market sectors. He also takes into account the possible 
damages caused by catastrophe, i.e., those due to severe drought or flood. The result 
of this broad and detailed estimation is a suggestion of much more stringent emission 
control than suggested by others researchers. 
For the calculation of benefits and costs, Cline divided the world into two 
groups: the developed countries and the less developed countries. For each group, 
future per capita income is determined by projecting base year per capita at assumed 
growth rates. Future population size is determined in the same way. The product of the 
projected per capita income and population yields the projected gross product of the 
group, and the sum of the two groups gives the gross world product. 
Global carbon emissions are exogenously projected and compared to the target 
set in the aggressive abatement program. The difference is the amount to be reduced. 
Change in temperature (the degree of warming) is determined by the radiative forcing 
of the emissions accumulated in the atmosphere. The path of warming is assumed 
linear, determined by two reference points, one of which is based on the climate 
sensitivity parameter for carbon dioxide doubling in 2050, the other is based on the 
projection for the very long-term warming in 2275. 
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The economic damage from global warming is assumed to be geometrically 
related to the amount of warming, with the damage from carbon-dioxide-equivalent-
I 
doubling corresponding to a temperature increase of 2.5°C as the benchmark. The 
benefits of emission abatement are the damages that can be avoided as a result of 
abatement. The costs of abatement are determined by the cost of afforestation, the 
reduction of carbon released from deforestation, and losses of output in the rest of the 
economy due to reduced fossil fuel emissions. The cost function for carbon reduction 
in the general economy depends on the percentage cutback· in carbon emission, but 
with adjustments that provide for an initial "free" reduction and a downward trend 
over time in costs because of improving technology. A carbon tax rate is determined 
that will achieve the required emissfon reduction. Carbon taxes are treated as a source 
of benefits on the assumption that they will be used to replace other taxes with excess 
burdens. 
The overall cost of abatement equals the world GDP multiplied by coefficients 
representing the three cost sources ( economywide output, afforestation, and 
deforestation reduction). The overall benefits are the gains from avoidance of warming 
(ultimately projected as. multiplied by world GDP), expanded to include gains from 
investment and the benefits. from taxes which reduce tax burdens. 
Using empirically-estimated parameters, assuming a low 1.5 percent discount 
rate on consumption and a pure time preference rate of zero, assuming risk aversion to 
the possibility of catastrophe, and taking into account the possibility of very long-term 
warming, Cline concluded that the benefits in terms of avoided damages from 
emission abatement actions should be high enough to justify much more stringent 
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emission control actions than suggested by other studies. Cline believes the difference 
between his results and those of other researchers is mainly from his consideration of 
long-term warming, while others argue that other factors (e.g., Cline's assumptions 
about the discount rate or the pure time preference rate) may contribute as much.4 
The DICE Model 
The DICE model (Nordhaus, 1994), or the Dynamic Integrate Model of the 
Climate and Economy, is a general equilibrium optimization global model. It 
calculates the optimal path for both capital accumulation and GHG emission 
reductions through the maximization of a utility function. The utility function in the 
DICE model represents the present value of the generalized (global) consumption level 
over time. The optimal paths are then compared to other scenarios, including cases 
where the objectives are to stabilize climate, to stabilize emissions at 80 percent of the 
1990 level, to stabilize emissions at the 1990 level, to delay any action by 10 years, 
and to apply geoengineering controls over emissions. The optimal results are also 
compared to the no-mitigation base case. The results of simulation by Nordhaus show 
that the optimal path is.better than the other alternatives in terms of reduced emissions 
and minimized climate change, except for the geoengineering option (which involves 
much unknown impacts and technologies). 
The DICE model is established based on the following reasoning: 
The level of consumption of goods and services by the entire population 
represents economic well-being and a higher level of consumption means a higher 
4 See Nordhaus, 1994, p. 56-8. 
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level of utility. The objective is to maximize utility of consumption subject to certain 
constraints. Consumption is a part of total production, which in turn is the result of the 
combined inputs of labor, capital and technology. Emission reduction policies have 
impacts on the supply of goods and services through a climate impact factor that is 
determined by both an abatement cost function and a damage function. 
The level of GHG emissions is determined by an emissions-output ratio. 
Annual emissions, together with previous accumulations of GHGs in the atmosphere, 
determine the current atmospheric accumulations of GHGs .. These accumulations are 
converted into radiative forcing, which results in projected changes in the mean 
temperatures of both the oceans and the earth's surface. When the global mean surface 
temperature on the earth changes, it causes other climate changes or other changes 
occur along with it. These. changes cause damages to the climate sensitive sectors of 
the economic system, e.g., agriculture, water resources, coastal activities, the 
construction sector, etc .. 
To reduce the damages caused by climate changes, Nordhaus prescribes taxes 
that reduce GHG emissions. The required emissions-reduction rate is determined by 
the demand and supply of emission-intensive products. Both the demand for and 
supply of emission-intensive products are functions of the prices of the products. An 
emissions tax would change the equilibrium prices, production, and consumption of 
these product. The optimization process in the model solves for the optimal emission 
reduction rate that maximizes utility; This emission reduction rate is used to determine 
the optimal emissions path, the cost of emissions reduction, and the optimal output and 
consumption of goods and services. 
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For convenience in estimating, the abatement cost function is put in total cost 
form rather than in marginal cost form. Both the total cost of emissions reduction and 
damages avoided are defined as a function of the emissions reduction rate. According 
to economic theory, optimization (the optimal emissions reduction rate) is achieved 
when the marginal cost (of emission reduction) is equal to the marginal benefit (from 
damages reduced or avoided). 
The DICE model allows some variables to be controlled and set at a 
predetermined level or within a specified range, which makes it possible to experiment 
with various polic)' options. A no-mitigation baseline case may be established by 
explicitly specifying a zero reduction rate. This results in an emission path which is 
determined only by the emissions-output ratio and the production level. Without the 
assumption of zero emission reduction rate, the model solves for the optimal 
emissions-reduction path that maximizes the economic well-being (utility) over time. 
The optimal case can be compared with the no-control case to determine the cost of 
emissions reduction. 
Other policy options can also be studied by specifying explicitly controlled 
variables. For example, by specifying the emission level as a command or control 
variable and setting it equal to the 1990 level or 80 percent of the 1990 level, the 
model solves for the optimal paths of emission reduction rates, as well as the 
corresponding output and consumption levels, subject to the specified emission 
constraints. The results can also be compared to the results from the base case or the 
non-constrained optimal case to determine the extra cost of the more stringent 
constraints. 
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Based on the logic outlined above, the DICE model maximizes the utility of 
the present value of global total consumption over time. The present value of global 
total consumption over time is the product of the present value of per capita 
consumption over time and the population level. The size of population is determined 
by the initial level and projected growth rate, allowing the growth rate to decline over 
time. 
Consumption is determined by production, which in turn is a function of labor, 
capital, and technology based on a Cobb-Douglas production function. Labor depends 
on population. Capital is determined by precious capital stock less depreciation plus 
investment. Technology ( or total factor product) is projected based on an initial level 
and a growth rate, allowing a decline of the growth rate over time. 
Climate impact on production hence consumption is through a climate factor 
that is determined by both an abatement cost function and a damage function. The 
~ 
abatement cost function is estimated using historical data and projections with the 
emissions reduction rate as the main determinant. The damage function is estimated 
with temperature change as the main determinant. 
Carbon emissions are determined by production and emissions-output ratio. It 
also depends on a variable called the emission reduction rate, which may either be 
policy controlled ot optimally solved. Adding new emissions to previous 
accumulations in the atmosphere, taking into account of the atmosphere-ocean transfer, 
total atmospheric accumulation is determined. The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide 
accumulations plus the forcing from other GHGs produces the total radiative forcing, 
which causes the temperature to rise, and the damages to increase. 
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The careful study of the structure of the DICE model reveals the possibility of 
modifying the global model into one that focuses on the specific case of an individual 
region or country. The emissions equation can be disaggregated into regional or 
country by country emissions. Then, adding the emissions by the regions or countries 
gives the world total emissions, which in tum would determine the atmospheric 
accumulation of GHGs, radiative forcing of the accumulation, and temperature changes 
caused by the radiative forcing. Damages caused by higher global mean temperatures 
may be estimated for each region or country, and so may the abatement costs. 
Combining the country specific damage function and the country specific abatement 
costs produces the country specific climate impact factor. This factor would affect the 
income, consumption, hence utility level of this country only. 
Given the structure of the DICE model, especially the possibility of modifying 
into to maximize the utility of one specific country, and my interest in analyzing 
China's role in generating as well as curbing global warming, this dissertation will 
capitalize on the features mentioned above of the DICE model in order to estimate 
China's contribution toward global warming and the impacts of climate change on 
China's economic well-being. Considerable modification is necessary to tum the global 
DICE model into the DICE-CHN model (the modified version of the DICE model). 
The details of the modifications and the structure of the DICE-CHN model are 
described in Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MODEL RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The DICE-CHN Model: Structure and Modifications 
The computer-coded version of DICE-CHN is presented in Appendix A. The 
basic structure of DICE-CHN is described later in this section and the calculation of 
the DICE-CHN parameters in the next section. This section begins with a discussion 
of the differences between the original DICE model and the modified version, or 
DICE-CHN. 
The DICE-CHN model uses the assumptions and logic of the original DICE 
model. Several modifications have been made, however. 
The major difference between the original DICE model and DICE-CHN is that, 
while the former treats the entire world as one single entity and assumes that all 
countries behave in a way to maximize a common world utility function, the latter 
focuses on China alone. DICE-CHN treats the rest of the world as exogenous and 
develops an explicit utility function for China. The assumed objective function of 
DICE-CHN is to maximize China's economic well-being over time, given the 
behavior of the rest of the world, subject to certain economic and climate constraints. 
DICE-CHN covers a time span of 250 years, starting the decade of 1970s 
(represented by 1975), instead of the 400 years projected in the DICE model. DICE-
CHN divides this time span into 10 year intervals. A time span of 250 years is long 
enough to capture virtually all of the long-run aspects examined by Cline. Most results 
are reported up to 2115, that is 15 periods of 10 year interval. 
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The initial time period in DICE-CHN is designated as 1975 rather than 1965 as 
in the original DICE model. This is a better starting date for China, both in terms of 
data availability and accurate representation of the contemporary Chinese economy. 
Each 10-year interval is represented by the fifth year of the decade, e.g. 1985 for the 
decade of 1980-1989, 1995 for the decade of 1990-1999, etc. For the first period, 
some parameters use the 1978 values (not 1975 values) as the initial values because of 
data availability. 
The original DICE model makes output a function of labor input, the capital 
stock, and technology, or total factor proquctivity, as determined by a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. The DICE-CHN model treats output exogenously. The real GDP 
in 1978 is used as the initial value of output, and the output level for each period 
thereafter is calculated by converting either the actual growth rate (before 1995) or the 
projected growth rates based on the Chinese government planning objectives into the 
multiple of 1978 GDP. This simplification seems essential, given the limitations on 
data on the Chinese economy. 
Income is defined in the DICE-CHN model as output multiplied by the climate 
impact factor~ Consumption is . assumed to be 65 percent of income, since, historically, 
the investment rate is 35 percent in China. When calculating losses in terms of income 
and consumption, output determined by the planned growth rate alone (without climate 
factor impact) is used as the benchmark. 
World total emissions in the DICE-CHN model consist of two parts: the 
emissions by China, which is determined by China's output, emissions-output ratio, 
and its emissions reduction rate, and emissions by the rest of the world, which is 
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exogenously determined by the growth rate of emissions by the rest of the world, 
allowing the growth rate to decline over time. The emissions by the rest of the world 
is also affected by its emission reduction rate. 
Finally, all monetary values are in Chinese yuans, to avoid the inconvenience 
caused by exchange rate conversions. 
Given the above modifications, the basic structure of the DICE-CHN model is 
as follows: 
max ~ U[c(t), L(t)] (l+p)" 1 
C (t) 
subject to economic constraints 
(1) U [c(t), L(t)] = L (t) {[c(t)] 1-cx - 1} I (l- a) 
(2) c(t) = C(t) I L(t) 
(3) C(t) = 0.65 Y(t) 
(4) Y(t) = Q(t) Q(t) 
and the emissions-climate-economic constraints 
(5) Q(t) = [ ( 1 - b, µ(t) b2 ) I ( l + <D1 T(t)"'2 ] 
(6) TC(t) = Q(t) b1 µ(tt2 
(7) MC(t) = Q(t) b1 b2 µ(tfb2-1l 
(8) D(t) = Q(t) <D, T(t)"'2 
(9) T(t) = T(t-1) + ( 1 I R1 ) { F(t) - A T(t-1) - (R2 I 't 12 ) [T(t-1) - O(t-1)]} 
(10) O(t) = O(t-1) + (l/R2 ) [T(t-1) - O(t-1)] 
(11) F(t) = 4.1 log [ M(t) I 590 ] I log ( 2 ) + FO(t) 
(12) M(t) -590 = p E(T-1) + (1-8M) [M(t-1) - 590] 
(13) E(t) = [ 1 - µc(t)] cr(t) Q(t) + [1- µo(t)] EO(T) 
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Definitions of the Variables and parameters: 
Objective Function: maximize the present value of total consumption, measured as 
the product of per capita consumption and exogenously determined population, 
discounted at the pure rate of social time preference. 
t: time periods in ten year intervals 
p: the pure rate of social time preference 
U: the level of utility 
c(t): per capita consumption at time t 
L(t): the population at time t; exogenously determined as a function of an 
initial level and growth rate 
(1) U(t): utility at time t; equal to the population, L(t), times the utility of per 
capita consumption, or U(c(t)) = {[c(t)]1-a - l}/ (1- a) 
a: a measure of the social valuation of different levels of consumption, or 
the rate of inequality aversion (the curvature of the utility function). 
This parameter reflects the extent to which society is willing to reduce 
the welfare of higher-income generations to improve the welfare of 
lower-income generations. a is the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
consumption. a is assumed equal to 1; thus, the utility function is the 
logarithmic or Bemoullian utility function, or 
U[c(t), L(t)] = L(t) {log[c(t)]} 
(2) c(t): per capita consumption, or total consumption, C(t), divided by total 
population, L(t) 
(3) C(t): total consumption at t, or 65 percent of income (Y), because the 
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investment rate has been historically at about 35 percent of GDP 
Y(t): total income, or output (GDP) adjusted for climate impact 
(4) Q(t): output at time t, determined by an initial level and growth rate, with 
1978 GDP as the initial value 
n: the climate impact factor, or the impact of emissions reductions and 
climate change on output, determined by both the total abatement cost 
function, TC, and the damage function, D (see below). 
(5) Q(t): climate impact at time t. The numerator of the factor, (l-b1 µ(tt2), is 
equal to [Q(t)-TC(t)] I Q(t), and captures the negative impact of 
abatement on output, while the denominator, (1 +<1>1 T(tyt'2), which is 
equal to [Q(t)+D(t)] l Q(t), captures the positive impact of the avoided 
climate change damages on 9utput 
(6) TC(t): total cost of emissions reduction as a fraction of total output, where b1 
is the scale coefficient of the cost function and b2 is the exponent of the 
cost function that reflects its nonlinearity. 
µ(t): the emissions control rate (emissions reduction rate), or the fractional 
reduction of emissions relative to uncontrolled emissions (percentage 
reduction of emissions). This is a control variable determined by policy 
or optimization. 
(7) MC(t): marginal cost of abatement; or the first deriva~ive of TC(t) in (6) 
(8) D(t): damages to the economy as the fractional loss of output from climate 
change, where <1>1 as the scale coefficient of the damage function and <1>2 
is the exponent of the damage function that captures nonlinearity. 
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(9) T(t): the temperature in the atmosphere at time t, as determined by the 
atmospheric temperature of the previous period, T( t-1 ), plus the 
warming effect. The warming effect depends on the thermal capacity of 
the atmosphere (R1) coupled with the radiative forcing, F(t), from GHG 
emissions, taking into account the transfer rate of thermal capacity 
between the atmosphere and the oceans. 
T(t-1) and O(t-1): the temperature in the atmosphere and in the deep oceans, 
respectively, at time t-1. 
R1 and R2: thermal capacity of the atmosphere and the oceans, respectively. 
't12: transfer rate of thermal capacity from the atmosphere to the oceans. 
)..: climate feedback parameter, captures the conversion ratio between 
radiative forcing (watts per square meter) and temperature change 
(degree C) 
F(t): the standard measure of radiative forcing in the atmosphere caused by 
accumulated GHGs relative to 1900 (the increase in surface warming 
per square meter (wm"2) ). 
(10) O(t): the temperature in the deep oceans at time t, determined in a similar 
way as the temperature in the atmosphere, only that radiative forcing is 
not present. 
(11) F(t): the radiative forcing from carbon dioxide accumulations (M(t)) relative 
to the preindustrial level of 590 GtC. This measure is based on the 
benchmark of 4.1 wm·2 for CO2 doubling. Also included is the radiative 
forcing from other GHGs, FO(T). 
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(12) M(t): the carbon dioxide concentration at time t, determined by adding part of 
the emissions during time t-1 to the accumulations at the beginning of 
time t-1. 
E(t-1 ): total world carbon dioxide emissions in t-1. 
p: marginal atmospheric retention ratio; or the percentage of GHGs 
emissions that stays in the atmosphere . It is estimated using the actual 
data on emissions and concentrations of CO2• 
BM: transfer rate of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere to the ocean. 
(13) E(t): total emissions at time t, or the sum of emissions by China and by the 
rest of the world. Emissions by China is the product of the output level, 
Q(t), and the emissions-output ratio, cr(t). cr(t) is the ratio of emissions 
to output in the absence of controls on gross output. E(t) also depends 
on the emissions reduction rate, µ(t), which depends, in turn, on policies 
and optimization. Emissions by the rest of the world, EO(t), is 
determined exogenously, using an initial value and growth rate per 
decade. 
Values of the DICE-CHN Model Parameters 
T: time period 25 ten-year intervals to cover a time span of 250 years, 
starting with 1970s (represented by 1975), and ending with 2210s (represented by 
2215). 
ALPHA (a): elasticity of marginal utility Assumed to be equal to one to yield 
the logarithmic or Bemoullian utility function: U[(c(t), L(t)] = L(t){log[c(t)]}. 
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RHO (p): rate of social time preference 
0.03 as in the Nordhaus DICE model. 
Measured in percent per year, or 
MO: carbon dioxide equivalent concentrations in 1975 698 GtC, according 
to Nordhaus (Nordhaus, 1994, p. 88). 
Al: damage coefficient for carbon dioxide doubling Carbon dioxide 
doubling is estimated to reduce China's agricultural output by 5 percent. In 1994, 5 
percent of agricultural output was 0.94 percent of GDP. Accordingly, the value of Al 
is assumed to be 0.0094. With economic development, the value of Al should fall, but 
no provision has been made for this possibility. 
B 1 & B2: intercept and exponent of control cost function In an experiment 
with the Nordhaus DICE model, Bowman (personal contact) estimated the Bl for 
China (representing the developing countries) is 0.04, Nordhaus' estimate of B2 is 
2.887. We use these .values in this study. 
L(D: population at time T L(t) is exogenously determined by projecting an 
initial value, LO, at a growth rate for each period, GL(T). LO is the 1975 population of 
924.2 million. GL(T) is determined by a combining a growth rate of population with a 
decline rate in the growth rate (DGL). The growth rate of population (in percent per 
decade) is assumed to be 0.16, an average of the growth rates of 1970-80 (0.189) and 
1975-85 (0.145). DGL is assumed to be 0.164, or the percentage decline in the growth 
rate between the 1970-80 and 1980-90 time periods ((0.189-0.158)/0.189). 
SIGMA(T): emissions-output ratio The emissions-output ratio is assumed to 
decline over time due to improved energy efficiency and switches between energy 
sources. The initial ratio (in 1978) was 1.135 tons of carbon dioxide emissions per 
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thousand yuan of GDP. The emissions-output ratio in 1985 was 0.63 tons of carbon 
dioxide emissions per thousand yuan of GDP, a 45 percent decline over the 1978 ratio. 
Thus, DSIGMAO, the decline rate of emissions-output ratio for the initial decade is 
assumed to be 0.45. The cumulative improvement of energy efficiency at time T, 
represented by the decline of the emissions-output ratio, DSIGMA(T), may be 
estimated using the initial value of the emissions-output ratio, the decline rate of the 
ratio, and the decline rate of the decline rate, with the assumption that the growth rate 
of the emission-output ratio would decline over time at the same rate technology 
declines, which is 0.11 per decade. In other words, the emissions-output ratio will 
decline, as energy efficiency improves, at an initial rate of 0.45 per decade, and the 
speed of that decline will slow down by 0.11 per decade. 
EROW(T): emissions by the rest of the world EROW(T) are exogenously 
determined by an initial level of the emissions by the rest of the world and a growth 
rate of emissions by the rest of the world. Nordhaus reported that world GHG 
emissions in 1975 were 5.89 GtC. China's share of total world emissions in 1975 was 
6.55 percent (Lu, 1989, p. 50). Thus, emissions of the rest of the world in 1975 were 
5.5 GtC, which is taken as the initial level (EROWO). By 1985, when world total 
emissions were 7.54 GtC, China's share increased to 10 percent, thus, emissions by 
the rest of the world were 6.79 GtC, a 23 percent increase for the decade (GEROW). 
In 1995, world emissions are expected to reach 9.28 GtC, and China's share will 
increase to 12 percent. Given these estimates, EROW would be 8.17 GtC, a 20 percent 
increase over 1985. Thus the growth rate of emissions by the rest of the world 
declined at a rate of 13 percent for the decade. Emissions by the rest of the world 
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(EROW) thus is estimated based on the initial value of 5.5 GtC in 1975, an initial 
emissions growth rate of 23 percent per decade, and the growth rate of emissions by 
the rest of the world declines at a rate of 13 percent per decade. 
Q(D: output level without climate factor impact QO is 1978 Chinese GDP, or 
0.359 trillion yuans. The growth rates of real GDP are reported in table 4.1 (page 76). 
In the computer program, growth rates are converted into multiples of 1978 GDP to 
simplify the equation used to calculate the output levels. 
The rest of the parameters assumes the values estimated by Nordhaus (1994). 
Model Results Report and Analysis: The First Run 
The values of several major parameters in each period of time are summarized 
in table 4.1 (page 75), with China's population and emissions-output ratio, and 
emissions by the rest of the world, estimated as explained above. Radiative forcing 
from other GHGs is from Nordhaus. The average annual growth rates of output in the 
first two decades are historical data. Growth rates for output between now and 2050 
are based on the Chinese government planning objectives (high growth rate scenario) 
as reported in Street, and in Xu; Growth rates for output are assumed to level out at 
2.5 percent after 2050. 
The DICE-CHN population projections are within the bounds of the United 
Nations projections (table 2.3 on page 33) at least up to 2025. After then, the United 
Nations projects the growth of China's population will level out then decline, while 
DICE-CHN projections show only a trend slowing growth. In DICE-CHN, a leveling 




















Table 4.1 Values of Major Parametersjn DICE-CHN 
Population Emission-Output Emissions Forcii1g from 
Ratio (t-C per by ROW other GHGs 
(millions) thousand yuans) {GtC) (GtCE) 
924.200 1.135 5.500 0.497 
I 071.160 0.741 6.824 0.604 
1214.084 0.506 8.247 0.705 
1350.254 0.359 9.739 0.800 
1477.744 0.265 11.270 · 0.887 
1595.351 0.201 12.812 0.968 
1702.483 0.157 14.339 1 .04 l 
1799;035 0.126 15.829 1.108 
1885.268 0.104 17.264 1.169 
1961 .692 0.087 18.632 1.222 
.. 2028.982 0.074 19.922 1.269 
2087.902 0.064 21.128 1.108 
2139.250 0.057 22.247 1.341 
2183.820 0.051 23.278 _L . 1.420 
2222.377 0.046 24.223 1.420 - ··- . 
Average Annual 

















The first run of the model simulates the aspects of limiting world annual GHG 
emissions to specific level: 8.045 GtC, 6.436 GtC, and 9.28 GtC. According to 
Nordhaus' projection, total world emissions in 1990 was 8.045 GtC. 1995 emissions 
were 9.28 GtC. The 6.436 GtC level is 80 percent of the 1990 level. Both the 8.045 
GtC and the 6.436 GtC constraints have been posed by other researchers. 
Three scenarios are experimented with in this first run. The scenarios are 
defined by the levels of emissions specified above. Under each scenario, three cases 
are examined to capture different combinations of optimal emissions reduction rate 
forChina (MIUC) and optimal emissions reduction rate for the rest of the world 
(MIUO). 
This produces nine cases. They are: 
I-A-1: no control over MIUC and MIUO, emissions limit 8.045 GtC; 
I-A-2: MIUC = 0, no control over MIUO, emissions limit 8.045 GtC; 
I-A-3: no control over MIUC, MIUO = 0, emissions limit 8.045 GtC; 
I-B-1: no control over MIUC and MIUO, emissions limit 6.436 GtC; 
I-B-2: MIUC = 0, no control over MIUO, emissions limit 6.436 GtC; 
I-B-3: no control over MIUC, MIUO = 0, emissions limit 6.436 GtC; 
I-C-1: no control over MIUC and MIUO, emissions limit 9.28 GtC; 
I-C-2: MIUC = 0, no control over MIUO, emissions limit 9.28 GtC; 
I-C-3: no control over MIUC, MIUO = 0, emissions limit 9.28 GtC. 
Table 4.2 on page 77 summarizes the income levels from each case, while 
table 4.3 on page 78 reports the combinations of MIUC and MIUO in each case. It 
appears that we are able to identify a case where the income level is the highest. 
However, a closer look at the results tells a different story. 
From table 4.3, the only time when China can afford not to reduce its 
emissions is when the rest of the world cuts back their emissions very aggressively. In 
case 2 under every scenario, MIUC is set at 0, and the resulting MIUO is very large 
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Table 4.2 Income from the First Run (trillion yuans) 
Scenario A (E=8.045) Scenario B (E=G.436) Scenario C (E=9.28) 
Year I-A-1 J-A-2 I-A-3 I-B-1 I-B-2 I-B-3 I-C-1 I-C-2 I-C-3 
2005 4.238 4.235 4.235 4.237 4.236 4.066 4.235 4.235 4.235 
2015 7.949 7.943 7.943 7.955 7.945 7.627 7.942 7.942 7.942 
2025 13.574 13.564 13.021 13.574 13.568 13.025 13.561 13.561 13.561 
2035 21.071 21.054 21.054 21.109 21.063 21.063 21.047 21.047 21.047 
-..J 
-..J 
2045 32.703 32.676 32.676 32.780 32.693 
I 
32.693 32.662 32.662 32.502 
2055 46. l 04 46.066 46.066 46.239 46.096 46.096 46.042 46.042 46.042 
2065 58.980 58.930 58.930 59.038 58.975 I 58.156 58.894 58.894 58.894 
2075 75.457 75.392 74.062 75.707 75.459 7,1.122 75.339 75.339 73.209 
2085 96.533 96.449 94.344 96.656 96.545 
I 
94.384 96.373 96.373 94.265 
2095 123.502 123.393 120.146 123.577 123.530 I 118.589 123.286 124.121 120.068 
2105 158.011 157.872 153.117 158.028 158.()62 I 151.740 157.722 158.080 153.045 2115 202.134 203.363 t 95.240 201.989 203 1GJ 202.243 201.772 201.926 201.772 
l 
2125 258.450 259.018 258.425 258.025 25fJ.267 I 258.786 258.105 258.212 258.143 --- -.. ·~·· .... ----.-1. 
.....J 
00 
Table 4.3 Emission Reduction Rates from the First Run (%) 
Scenario A (E=8.045) Scenario B (E=6.436) Scenario C (E=9.28) 
. ·-
Year I-A-1 J-A-2 I-A-3 I-B-1 I-B-2 I-B-3 I-C-1 I-C-2 I-C-3 
µC µO µC µO ~LC ~10 µC. µO µ.C ~tO ~LC ~tO µC ~LO ~LC µO µC µO 
2005 0 33.0 0 33.0 1 0 0 49.6 0 49.6 l 0 0 20.4 0 20.4 1 0 
2015 0 47.3 0 47.3 1 0 0 61.6 0 61.6 l 0 0 36.3 0 36.3 I 0 
2025 0 58.5 0 58.5 1 0 0 71.1 0 71.1 I 0 0 48.9 0 48.9 I 0 
2035 0 67.0 0 67.0 1 0 0 78.3 o• 78.31 I 0 0 58.4 0 58.4 1 0 
2045 0 75.3 0 75.3 1 0 0 85.5 . 0 85.5 I 0 0 67.5 0 67.5 I 0 
2055 0 81.1 0 81. l 1 0 0 90.5 0 90.5 I 0 0 74.0 0 74.0 I 0 
2065 0 84.4 0 84.4 J 0 0 93.0 () 93.0 1 0 0 77.8 0 77.8 1 0 
2075 0 87.8 O· 87.8 1 0 0 95.5 (l ,, 95.9 1 0 0 81.6 0 81.6 1 0 
2085 0 91.4 0 91.4 I 0 0 99.0 0 99.0 I 0 0 85.6 0 85.6 1 0 
2095 0 95.4 0 95.4 I 0 8.4 1 0 ! l 0 0 89.9 0 89.9 1 0 
2105 0 99.9 0 99.9 1 0 19.8 l 0 1 l 0 0 94.6 0 94.6 1 0 
2115 13.3 l 0 l 1 0 30.6 1 0 1 u 0 0 l 0 1 1 0 
2125 25.8 1 0 l l 0 49.7 1 0 l l 0 14.4 1 0 l l 0 -- - -·-·---- --
* ~tC = MIUC, µO = MIUO. 
and increasing, starting in the first decade of the next century, and reaches 1 sooner 
or later, depending on the total emissions limitation. Even with the rest of the world 
cutting back their emissions aggressively, all China can do is to delay emission 
reductions. This follows from comparing cases 1 and 2 under each scenario. Note that 
the optimal MIUC is not zero forever. Sooner or later, depending on the emissions 
limitation, China would have to start reducing its own emissions. This is because, as 
the rest of the world is cutting back on their emissions, the share of China's emissions 
in the world total is increasing and the absolute magnitude of China's emissions alone 
is enough to cause climate damages to its own economy, as well as to the economy 
of the rest of the world. 
On the other hand, MIUC goes to l whenever MIUO = 0. In case 3 under all 
three scenarios, when MIUO is set at 0, the optimal MIUC is 1. This suggests that 
emissions by the rest of the world are large enough to damage China's economy. 
Therefore, the best thing China can do to maximize its own well-being is not to emit 
any GHGs at all. Also, if we look at the income levels reported in table 4.2, under 
each scenario, income in case 3 is always the lowest unless MIUO is 1. This may be 
interpreted as a high dependence of China's economic well-being on emissions in the 
rest of the world. The interdependence of China and the rest of the world on the issue 
of limiting global climate change can be seen clearly here. If China does not 
participate in efforts to reduce GHG emissions, even though the rest of the world does 
not emit at all, the emissions by China, alone, are enough to cause damages to 
China's economy, and very likely to the rest of the world, too. If the rest of the world 
does not reduce its emissions at all, China would face losses in terms of income even 
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if it reduces its emissions by 100 percent. Without the participation by both parties, 
the entire world would lose one way or the other. 
Since 100 percent emissions reduction by either China or the rest of the world 
is not possible, we conclude that limiting world annual emissions to any of the three 
assumed level is not feasible, at least from the perspective of maximizing China's 
utility. However, by examing the income levels from each case, we can see that it is 
better for China if emissions are limited to the lower level. Under the three scenarios, 
the income level from scenario B is the highest ( emission level the lowest), while the 
income level in scenario C is the lowest (emission level the highest). This indicates 
the sensitivity of China's economy toward climatic conditions. In other words, as a 
developing country, with a large agricultural sector that is very climate-sensitive, and a 
long coastline with much ofthe country's production capacity along it, it should be in 
China's own interest to limit the GHG emissions to a lower level. 
Model Results Report and Analysis: The Second Run 
From the results of the first run we can see that stabilizing world annual 
emissions require aggressive emission reduction in the next a hundred years either by 
China or by the rest of the world. However, it is unrealistic to ask either party to 
reduce their GHG emissions so aggressively. Therefore, the second run of the model 
abandons the goal of stabilizing emissions, and focuses on finding the optimal 
emission paths. 
Two scenarios are defined in the second run. In scenario A, MIUC = 0, or the 
emissions reduction rate of China is zero in every period of time (business as usual for 
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China). In scenario B, there is no control over MIUC; i.e., MIUC is solved for through 
optimization, given the behavior of the rest of the world. 
Under each scenario, three cases are explored, with MIUO=O, MIU0=0.2, and 
MIUO optimally solved for. The first case is when the rest of the world carries out 
"business as usual", the third case is what is "expected" from the rest of the world to 
maximize China's utility. The second case assumes that the rest of the world reduces 
their emissions by 20 percent each period, compared to the uncontrolled (business as 
usual) case. The 20 percent reduction level is not cho~en on any economic or scientific 
basis. Cases I-B-1, I-B-2, and I-B-3, above, incorporate a 20 percent freeze in 
emissions. Cases 11-B-1, 11-B-2, and 11-B-3, below, incorporate a 20 percent reduction 
relative to business as usual. The latter reflect a somewhat more reasonable and 
achievable "20 percent reduction" goal. 
The two scenarios and three cases under each produces six cases: 
11-A-1: MIUC = 0, MIUO = 0 (the equivalent of the Nordhaus base case, or 
business as usual in other studies); 
11-A-2: MIUC = 0, MIUO = 0.2; 
11-A-3: MIUC = 0, no control over MIUO; 
11-B-1: no control over MIUC, MIUO = O; 
11-B-2: no control over MIUC, MIUO = 0.2; 
11-B-3: no control over MIUC, no control over MIUO (the optimal case for 
China, with both MIUC and MIUO solved through optimizationr 
Case 11-A-1 in DICE-CHN is equivalent to the Nordhaus base case, where 
there is no emissions reduction or abatement effort by any country. It is also called the 
business-as-usual (BAU) scenario in other studies. The results generated by DICE-
CHN for case 11-A-1 are comparable to Nordhaus uncontrolled scenario in terms of 
world emissions, atmospheric concentrations of GHGs, and increase in global surface 
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Scenario 11-B in the DICE-CHN is the "optimal" scenario for China. However, 
since the behavior of the rest of the world is exogenously determined, the "optimal" 
emissions reduction rate as well as output growth rate differs, depending on the 
assumptions about the rest of the world emissions. An interesting, but not surprising, 
result is that whenever MIUO is not explicitly controlled, it always goes to 1. This is 
understandable, since for China's own well-being, if the rest of the world does not 
emit any GHGs, the damage potential would be minimum and the abatement cost 
would also be minimum. In fact, MIUO goes to 1 in both cases 11-A-3 and 11-B-3 
when it is determined through optimization. In 11-A-3, MIUC is fixed at 0, while in 11-
B-3, MIUC is also determined through optimization. 
Refer to table 4.5 on page 84. Even with MIUO = 1 (11-B-3), the optimal 
emissions reduction rate for China is still not zero. The only difference is that if 
MIUO = 1, it allows China's emissions reduction rates to be lower than when MIUO 
= 0 or 0.2, at least before 2085. However, after 2085, the emissions reduction rates by 
China should be higher than in the other two cases. This result indicates that emissions 
by China only would be enough to cause losses in its output or income. Comparing 
cases 11-A-3 (where MIUC = 0) and 11-B-3 (optimal MIUC greater than 0), in table 
4.6 on page 85, income (that is, output with climate factor impact) in case 11-B-3 is 
either equal to (before 2065) or higher than (starting in 2065) income in 11-A-3. 
Similar results can be seen in terms of consumption (table 4. 7 on page 86) and per 
capita consumption (table 4.8 on page 87). Actually, this conclusion can be 
generalized to include all cases. Given emissions reduction rates by the rest of the 




Table 4.5 Optimal MIUC Hvni the Second Run(%) 
-· 
Year 11-B-2 11-B-3 
2005 3.8 3.6 
2015 4.5 4.3 
2025 -S. I 4.9 
2035 5.7 5.4 
2045 6.3 '6.1 
205~ 6.8 6.5 





























































Table 4.6 Income from the Second Run (trillion yuans) 
-
Income (Y) 
Scenario A Scenario B 
11-A-2 11-A.;3 JI-B-1 ll-B-2 11-B-3 
0.359 0.359 0.359 0.359 0.359 
0.854 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.854 
2.056 2.056 2.056 2.056 2.056 
4.236 4.236 4.236 4.236 4.236 
7.944 7.944 7.944 7.944 7.944 
13.565 IJ.568 1 J.564 13.565 13.568 
21.053 21.066 21.049 21.053 21.066 
32.666 32.707 32,655 32.666 32.707 
46.033 46;}26 46.001) 46.033 46.126 
58.854 59·_021 58.811 58.856 59.028 
75.241 75.538 ·' - 75.168 75.245 75.541 
96.173 96.658 96.054 96;179 
96.664 J 
122.918 123.684 122. 7JL1 t'22.929 123.694 
157.090 158.263 156.81 J, 157. l 09 158.279 
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Consumption with climate facto 
Scenario A -
11-A-2 11-A-3 11-B-l 
--
0.233 0.233 0.233 
0.555 0.555 0.555 
1.336 1.336 1.336 
2.753 2.753 2.753 
5.164 5.164 5.164 
8.817 8.819 8.816 ·• 
13.684 13.693 · 13.682 
21.233 21 .259 21.226 
29.921 . 29.982 29.906 
38.255 · 38.367 38.227 
48.907 49. l 00 48.859 
62.512 62.828 62.435 
79.897 80.395 79.777 
102.108 102.871 101.928 





































Table 4.8 Per capita Consumption with and_ without Climate Impact 
(thousand yuans) 
Per Capita Con sumption (CI L) 
Scenario A Scenario B 
Year C* IL II-A-I ll-A-2 IJ-A-3 ll-B-1 II-B-2 
1975 0.252 0.252 0.252 0.252 0.252 0.252 
1985 0.518 0.518 0.518 0.518 0.518 0.518 
1995 1.101 1.101 1.101 1.101 1.101 1.101 
2005 2.041 2.039 2.039 2.039 2.039 2.039 
2015 3.499 3.494 3.494 3.494 3.494 3.494 
2025 5.538 5.526 5.527 5.528 5.526 5.527 
2035 8.059 8.036 8.038 8.043 8.036 8.038 
2045 11.844 11.798 11.802 11.817 11.798 11.802 
2055 15.942 15.863 15.871 15.903 15.863 15.871 
2065 I 9.611 19.486 19.501 19.558 19.487 19.502 
2075 24.270 24.079 24. l 04 24.199 24.081 24.105 
2085 30.188 29.901 29.940 · 30.091 29.903 29.942 
2095 37.713 37.289 37.348 37.581 17.292 37.35 I 
2105 47.288 46.669 46.757 47.106 : t6.674 46.762 
_2115 59.480 58.582 58.710 59.2?2_1 58.591 58.719 
------·.----

















MIUO=O (II-B-1 and 11-A-l), China's income, consumption and per capita 
consumption are all higher when its emissions reduction rate is higher than zero ( case 
11-B-1). The result is similar when MIUO = 0.2 (II-B-2 and 11-A-2). The result that 
there is no difference in incomes ( and consumptions) before 2065 may reflect the fact 
that the impact of GHG concentrations do not show until decades later. For the same 
reason, optimal MIUC may be lower before 2065 when MIUO = 1, but has to be 
higher thereafter when compared to cases where MIUO = 0 or 0.2. 
In scenario 11-B, when China follows the optimal emissions reduction path, the 
optimal MIUC (table 4.5 on page 84) in cases 11-B-1 and 11-B-2 seems strange at the 
glance. It would be easier to understand if MIUC in 11-B-1 is higher than MIUC in 11-
B-2, because in 11-B-1, the rest of the world is not reducing its emissions at all. 
Therefore, China would have to reduce emissions more to reduce the effects of climate 
changes. In 11-B-2, when the rest of the world reduces their emissions by 20 percent, 
China should be able to afford a smaller reductions in its emissions. 
However, the impact of MIUC is not limited to temperature (climate) change 
only. MIUC is also a determinant of the total costs of emissions reductions. Recall that 
the climate impact factor has two parts: first, the economic damages caused by climate 
change, and, second, the costs of reducing climate change. Because of the relationship 
between production and emissions, reducing emissions reduces output. By reducing 
emissions, however, damages caused by climate change can also be reduced. The 
climate impact factor therefore is equal to ((Q-TC)/Q)/((Q+D)/Q), or (Q-TC)/(Q+D). 
Thus, MIUC has a more complicated role to play than simply that of determining total 
world emissions. Higher MIUC would cause higher TC, but also would reduce D, 
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making its impact on the climate factor hard to determine simply by the direction of 
change. The magnitude of change is more important in optimization. 
As China's share in the world total emissions increases (table 4.9 on page 90), 
a 20 percent emissions reduction by the rest of the world becomes less important. To 
avoid damages to China caused by climate change, it may be optimal for China to 
reduce emissions more, even though this would mean a higher abatement cost. 
As in the first run, although MIUO = 1 provides some very interesting results, 
it is unlikely to be practically "feasible". Thus, from the point view of policy 
implications, only cases where MIUO = 0 and. 0.2 are meaningful. 
Table 4.10 (on page 91) summarizes the percentage income losses from the 
four cases 11-A-l, 11-A-2, 11-B-l, and 11-B-2, as compared to the situation when there 
are no climate factor impacts. Generally speaking, the reduction in China's economic 
well-being is less when the rest of the world reduces its emissions, say, by 20 percent 
(MIUO = 0.2) than when they do not (MIUO = 0). And, given the emissions reduction 
rate by the rest of the world, the reduction in China's economic well-being is less if 
China follows its optimal emissions reduction path than if China does not reduce its 
emissions at all. 
When the four cases are ranked according to the losses in China's income, 11-
B-2 is the best option (lowest loss) and 11-A-1 is the worst (highest loss). The ranking 
would be the same using percentage losses in consumption and per capita 
consumption. 
Table 4.11 (page 92) reports the optimal growth rates of output based on the 













Table 4.9 China's share in world emissiQos: the Optimal Case('@ 
II-B-1 II-B-2 Lu* 































* Lu, 1989, p.50, with nuclear energy, 2050 as the target year for China to catch up 
with the lower level of developed countries. 
Table 4.10 Percentage Losses in Income due to Climate Factor Impact(%) 
Percentage Loss in Y Percentage Loss in C Percentage Loss in CPC 
Year II-A-I II-A-2 11-B-1 II-B-2 II-A-I 11-A-2 11-B- l II-B-2 11-A-1 11-A-2 11-B-1 11-B-2 
2005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.00 l -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
2015 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
2025 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0:002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
2035 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
2045 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003. -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
2055 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
I.() 2065 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
2075 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 .. Q.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0;007 
2085 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 •. -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 
2095 -0.011 -0.010 -0.01 l -0.010 -0.01 l -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 
2105 -0.013 -0.01 l -0.013 -0.0ll -0.013 -0.011· -0.013 -0.0 l 1 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 











































Table 4.11 Optimal Growth Rate of Output 
Optimal Optimal Optimal Output Optimal Growth planned 
MIUC Reduction Emission Level Level Rate of Output growth 
Amount (GtC) (GtC) (trillion yuans) (%) rate(%) 
11-B-l 11-B-2 11-B-1 II-B-2 11-0-1 II-B-2 11-B-1 11-B-2 II-B-1 II-B-2 
3.8 3.8 0.056 0.056 1.410 1.410 3.928 3.928 6.3 6.3 6.5 
4.5 4.5 0.090 0.090 1.920 l.920 7.244 7.244 5.4 5.4 5.5 
5.1 5.1 0.132 0.132 2.460 2.460 12.238 12.240 4.4 4.4 4.5 
5.7 5.7 0.178 0.178 2.953 2.952 18.806 18.805 4.4 4.4 4.5 
6.3 6.3 0.244 0.244 3.631 3.630 28.816 28.808 3.4 3.3 3.5 
6.7 6.8 0.299 0.304 4. 168 4.161 40.074 40.011 2.5 2.5 2.5 
6.9 7.0 0.330 0.334 4.452 4.444 51.173 51.079 2.5 2.5 2.5 
7.2 7.2 0.375 0.375 4.836 4.832 65.349 65.291 2.5 2.5 2.5 
7.5 7.6 0.433 0.438 5.336 5.325 83.380 83.198 2.3 2.3 2.5 
7.8 7.9 0.505 0.511 .5.972 5.957 104.768 104.516 2.4 2.4 2.5 
8.2 8.4 0.604 0.618 6.762 6.736 132.588 132.076 2.4 2.4 2.5 
8.7 8.9 0.737 0.753 7.734 7.703 168.131 167.458 2.4 2.4 2.5 
growth rate is slightly lower than the planned growth rates starting right now, but the 
growth rate of output after 2125 exceeds the planned growth rate for most of the 
subsequent periods. This may be consistent with the thinking that the welfare impact 
of emissions reduction is time-sensitive, meaning that emissions reduced now would 
improve economic well-being more than emissions reductions taken in the future. 
The optimal growth rates of output for cases II-B-1 and II-B-2 are almost 
identical. One explanation may be that, since the share of China's emissions in the 
world total increases with time (see table 4.9 on page 90), a 20 percent reduction by 
the rest of the world has a smaller impact on China's economic well-being and on 
China's optimal growth rates of output. China's optimal results are determined more 
by its own production level than by economic activity in the rest of the world. 
Summary 
Based on the model results and analyses reported in this chapter, the "optimal" 
and most feasible case would be II-B-2, where the rest of the world reduces 20 percent 
of its emissions in each period, relative to the uncontrolled (business-as-usual) case, 
and China. follows its optimal emissions reduction path, which requires a reduction rate 
of between 3.8 percent starting the beginning of the next century to 11 percent later in 
the future. The percentage loss in income and consumption is the lowest in this case, 
among the cases studied, and the reduction objective seems achievable. 
According to the projections of the DICE-CHN model, by the middle of the 
next century (2055), GHG accumulations in the atmosphere are to reach 1088 GtC, or 
somewhat less than double the preindustrial level of 590 GtC, and the doubling of the 
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concentration would not occur until more than one decade later. The global surface 
mean temperature in 2075 (shortly after the doubling occurs) would be 2.56 °C higher 




In Chapter IV, we concluded that the best (optimal and feasible) case is II-B-2, 
where there is no fixed limitation on emissions, the rest of the world reduces their 
emissions by 20 percent relative to the uncontrolled level, and China follows its 
optimal emissions reduction path. Case II-B-2 will be referred to as the optimal case 
in this chapter. The sensitivity analysis focuses on both the base case, where MIUC 
and MIUO are both equal to 0, and the optimal case to show how sensitive income 
and emissions reduction rates are to changes in the basic parameters of the model. 
RHO: the Pure Rate of Social Time Preference (the Discount Rate) 
In the DICE-CHN, RHO (p) equals 0.03 as in the original DICE model. Two 
other values of RHO are specified for the sensitivity analysis: 0 and 0.06. There are 
two reasons for choosing these two values: (1) these are the values chosen by van 
Ierland & Derksen (1994) in their sensitivity analysis for the Nordhaus DICE model, 
(2) Cline (1992) uses a pure rate of social time [reference of zero, and 0.06 gives the 
same magnitude of difference as O from 0.03, the value used in DICE-CHN. 
In the base case, where MIUC and MIUO are explicitly set at 0, the difference 
in the values of RHO has no impact on the income level. Income levels for all 
peoriods are identical at all three values of RHO. This suggests that income level is 
not sensitive to the value RHO, perhaps because income level is directly related to 
emissions reduction rate, which is set at O in all three cases. However, this result does 
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not rule out the possibility of the optimal emissions reduction rate being sensitive to 
the value of RHO. 
The optimal case explains the reasoning above more clearly. The optimal 
MIUC is very sensitive to RHO. In table 5.1 on page 97, when there is no discounting 
factor (RHO=O), MIUC is higher than 10 percent for all periods (ranging from 13 
percent to more than 20 percent). However, at a discount rate of 0.06, MIUC is no 
higher than 5 percent until close to the end of the study time span. The 100 percent 
decline in the discount rate (from 3 percent to O percent) resulted in a 35 percent to 
more than 200 percent increase in the optimal · MIU C, while the 100 percent increase 
in RHO from 0.03 to 0.06 results in about a 50 percent reduction in the optimal MIUC 
before 2085. However, although income levels are different for the three values of 
RHO, the difference in percentage loss of income between the cases of RHO=O and 
RH0=0.06 almost never exceeds 0.2 percent. In fact, the differences in income loss in 
most periods are less than 0.1 percent of output, with the loss at RHO=O less than the 
loss at RH0=0.06 before 2105, and the other way around after that. The percentage 
loss in income relative to output, without climate factor impact, increases over time for 
all three cases. 
Al: Coefficient of the Damage Function from Carbon Dioxide Doubling 
As explained in chapter IV, Al in DICE-CHN is estimated as 0.0094. This is a 
parameter whose value is uncertain at the existing state of knowledge. For sensitivity 
analysis, Al assumes two other values: 0.0044 and 0.0144, or 53 percent lower and 




Table 5.1 Sensitivity to RHO 
Income ·· Loss in Income 
year Output RIIO=O RH0=0.03 RH0=0.06 RHO=O RH0=0.03 RH0=0.06 
-· 
2005 4.240 4.235 4.236 4.236 0.118 0.094 0.094 
2015 7.955 7.943 7.944 7.944 0.151 0.138 0.138 
2025 13.592 13.562 13.565 13.565 0.221 0.199 0.199 
2035 21.109 21.048 21.053 21.053 ·0.289 .0.265 0.265 
2045 32.780 32.657 32.666 32.666 .· 0.375 · 0.348 0.348 
2055 46.239 . 46.02] 46.033 46.033 0.471 0.446 0.446 
2065 59.185 58.842 58.856 58.856 0.580 0.556 0.556 
2075 75.760 75.230 75.245 75.244 0:100 0.680 0.681 
2085 96.969 96.164 96.179 96.177 0.830 0.815 0.817 
2095 124.121 122.915 122.929 122.925 .· 0.972 0.960 0.964 
2105 158.875 157.097 157.109 157.102 1.1 l 9 1.112 1.116 
2115 203.363 200.756 200.762 200.749 1.282 1.279 1.285 
2125 260.304 256.548 256.543 256.517 1.443 1.445 1.455 
2135 333.188 327.841 327.815 327.767 1.605 1.613 1.627 
2145 426.481 418.939 418.871 418.786 1.768 1.784 1.804 
2155 545.895 535.33 I 535.185 535.039 1.935 1.962 1.989 -
Note: Output and income are in trillion yuans, others in percentage. 
Optimal MIUC 
RHO= RH0=0.03 RH0=0.06 
0 
13.0 3.8 1.9 
14.7 4.5 2.2 
16.2 5.1 2.6 
17.2 5.7 2.9 
18.5 6.3 3.3 
19.2 6.8 3.5 
19. l 7.0 3.7 
19.2 7.2 3.8 
19.4 7.6 4.0 
19.7 7.9 0.0 
20.0 8.4 0.0 
20.3 8.9 0.0 
20.6 9.4 0.0 
20.8 9.9 0.0 
20.7 10.4 0.0 
20.3 10.8 0.0 
For the base case (table 5.2 on page 99), at Al =0.0044, the percentage loss in 
income is never higher than 2 percent of the output. However, with Al=0.0144, the 
percentage loss can be more than 5 percent. The percentage loss in income is always 
more than three times as high when Al=0.0144 as compared to Al=0.0044. Given the 
fact that the high value of Al (0.0144) is 3.27 times as high as the low value of Al 
(0.0044), this may imply that the relationship between Al and percentage income loss 
is linear. Alternatively, a 53 percent reduction in Al results in more than a 50 percent 
reduction in income loss, while a 53 percent increase in Al leads to more than a 50 
· percent of increase in income loss. It appears from these calculations that change in 
the percentage income loss is approximately equal to change in Al. 
The percentage loss in income is Jess in the optimal case (table 5 .3 on page 
100) than in the base case, with the highest loss being less that 5 percent of output. 
This result is consistent with the conclusion in Chapter IV that it is optimal for China 
to follow the optimal emissions reduction path rather than not reducing its emissions at 
all. The optimal emissions reduction rate for China is always 80 percent higher when 
Al takes the high value rather than the low value. When compa,red to the optimal 
emissions reduction rate at the default value of Al, a 53 percent reduction in Al 
results in a reduction in the optimal MIUC of only about 35 percent, while a 53 
percent increase in Al leads to an increase in optimal MIUC of only about 25 percent. 
However, sensitivity of percentage income loss to Al is still about 1, meaning, the 
percentage loss in the high Al case is still more than three times higher than in the 




Table 5.2 Sensitivity to Al_: the Base Case 
·-~· 
Income 
year Output Al=0.0044 Al=:0.0094 Al=0.0144 J\ 1=0.0044 
~-
2005 4.24 4.238 4.236 4.234 0.047 
2015 7.955 7.950 7.944 7.938 0.063 
2025 13.592 13.579 13.564 l 3.549 0.096 
2035 21. I 09 21.081 21.049 21.017 0.133 
2045 32.78 32.721 32.655 32.589 0.180 
2055 46.239 46.131 46.009 45.887 0.234 
2065 59.185 59.009 58.810 58.612 . 0.297 
2075 75.76 75.480 75.164 74.852 0.370 
2085 96.969 96.536 96.047 95.564 0.447 
2095 124.121 123.462 122.722 121.991 0.531 
2105 158.875 157.894 156.794 155.709 0.617 
2115 203.363 201.915 200.294 198.699 0.712 
2125 260.304 258.206 255.863 253.562 0.806 
2135 333.188 330.188 · 326.844 323.567 0.900 
2145 426.481 422.231 417.502 412.879 0.997 
2155 545.895 539.915 533.276 526.799 1.095 
-· -----·--
Nole: Output and income are in trillion yuans, loss is in percentage. 




















Table 5.3 Sensitivity to A I: _the Optimal Case 
Income Lo~,s in Income 
year Output Al=0.0044 Al=0.0094 Al=0.0144 Al =0.0044 Al "0{).0094 Al =0.0144 
·-· -
2005 4.24 4.238 4.236 4.234 0.047 0.094 0.142 
2015 7.955 7.950 7.944 7.938 0.063 0.138 0.214 
2025 I J.592 13.579 13.565 13.550 0.096 0.199 0.309 
2035 21.109 21.083 21.053 21.022 00123 0.265 0.412 
2045 32.78 32.727 32.666 32.605 0.162 0.348 0.534 
2055 46.239 46.142 46.033 45.925 0.210 0.446 0.679 
2065 59.185 59.030 58.856 58.683 0.262 0.556 0.848 
' 
2075 75.76 75.517 75.245 74.975 0.321 0.680 1.036 
2085 96.969 96.597 96.179 95. 766 0.384 0.815 1.24 I 
2095 124.121 · 123.558 122.929 122.309 0.454 0.960 1.460 
2105 158.875 158.041 157.109 156.192 0.525 1.112 1.689 
2115 203.363 202.132 200.762 199.417 0.605 1.279 1.940 
2125 260.304 258.522 256.543 254.605 0.685 1.445 2.189 
2135 333.188 330.639 327.815 325.055 0.765 1.613 2.441 
2145 426.481 422.866 418.871 414.977 0.848 1.784 2.697 
2155 545.895 540.800 535.185 529.728 0.933 1.962 2.962 
2165 698.747 691.597 683.746 l 676.138 1.023 2.147 3.236 
2175 894.395 884.396 873.459 862.894 1.118 1 2.341 1 3.s22 - ··------- ---
Note: Output and income are in trillion yuans, others in pcrccnt;,ge. 
Optimal MIUC 
Al=0.0044 Al=0.0094 Al=0.0144 
2.5 3.8 4.7 
3.0 4.5 5.6 
3.4 5.1 6.4 
3.8 5.7 7.1 
4.2 6.3 7.9 
4.5 6.8 8.5 
4.7 7.0 8.7 
4.9 7.2 9.0 
5.1 7.6 9.4 
5.3 7.9 9.9 
5.6 8.4 l 0.5 
6.0 8.9 11. 1 
6.3 9.4 11.7 
6.7 9.9 12.4 
7.0 l 0.4 13.0 
7.3 10.8 13.5 
7.4 11.0 13.7 
7.2 10.7 13.4 
.. 
DSIGMA: the Decline Rate of Emission-Output Ratio 
The emission-output ratio is expected to decline over time because of both 
energy efficiency improvements and energy source switching. The decline rate of the 
emissions-output ratio measures how fast energy efficiency improves and energy 
sources are switched (from high to low carbon concentration fossil fuels, or from 
fossil fuels to non-fossil fuels). This decline rate is one of the more uncertain 
parameters, especially in a very long-term context. The original value of DSIGMA in 
DICE-CHN is equal to 0.45, calculated using two decades of historical data. For 
sensitivity analysis, we examine two more values: 0.35 and 0.55 -- differences of 22 
percent from the default value. 
For the base case (table 5.4 on page 102), the faster decline of the emission-
output · ratio results in smaller losses in income, and the further into the future, the 
larger the gain in terms of "avoided" loss through improved energy efficiency or 
energy source switching. For the first three decades of the next century, there are no 
differences in income at different emissions-output ratios. This is due to the fact that 
the impacts from emissions occur decades later. Therefore, lower current emissions do 
not reduce current income losses because current income losses are caused by 
emissions that occurred decades ago. 
Refer to table 5.5 on page 103. The optimal MIUC, is lower when the 
emissions-output ratio declines faster (DSIGMA=0.55), since a lower emissions-output 
ratio implies fewer emissions at a given output level and requires a smaller reduction. 
Also, the percentage income loss is less DSIGMA is higher, because better energy 



















2145 426.48 l 
2155 545.895 
Table 5.4 Sensitivity to DSIGMA~~-Base Case 
Income 
I Dsig= 0.35 Dsig= 0.45 Dsig=---= 1 r 4.236 4.236 4.23 
7.944 7.944 7.94 
13.563 13.564 13.5( 
21.048 21.049 21.0: 
32.651 32.655 32.6: 
45.998 46.009 46.0: 
58.786 58.810 58.8: 
7S: 118 75.164 75. l~ 
95.961 96.047 96.H 
122.574 122.722 122.8 
156.546 156.794 • 156.9 
199.893 200.294 . 200.5 
255.226 255.863 256.2 
325.85 326.8441327.4 
415.967 417.502 418.: 
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Table 5.5 Sensitivity to DSIGMA: the Optimal Case 
Income loss in Income Optimal MIUC 
Dsig= 0.45 D~ig= 0.55 Dsig= 0.35 Dsig= 0.45 Dsig= 0.55 Dsig= 0.35 Dsig= 0.45 Dsig= 0.55 
4.236 4.236 0.094 0.094 0.094 4.4 3.8 3.3 
7.944 7.944 0.138 0. 138 0. 138 5.3 4.5 3.8 
13.565 13.565 0.206 ·. 0.199 0.199 6.3 5.1 4.2 
2 l .053 2 l.054 0:275 0.265 0.261 7.1 5.7 4.5 
32.666 32.669 0.363 0.348 0.339 8.2 6.3 4.9 
46.033 46.041 0.469 . 0.446 0.428 8.9 6.8 5.1 
58.856 58.871 0.595 0.556 0.531 9.4 7.0 5.2 
75.245 75.274 0.739 0.680 0.641 9.9 7.2 5.3 
96.179 96.23 0.898 0.815 0.762 10.4 7.6 5.4 
122.929 123.015 1.072 0.960 0.891 I I. I 7.9 5.6 
157.109 157.249 1.257 1.112 1.023 11.8 8.4 5.9 
200.762 200.984 1.462 1 .279 1.170 12.6 8.9 6.2 
.256.543 256.888 1.672 1.445 1.312 13.4 9.4 6.5 
327.815 328.344 1.889 1.613 1 .454 14.2 9.9 6.8 
418.871 419.676 2.1 I 7 1.784 1.596 14.9 10.4 7. I 
535.185 .. .L 536.4 2.359 1.962 1.739 15.5 10.8 7.4 ~---·•--w 
Note: Output and income in trillion ytwns, others in percentage. 
The loss in income is less in the optimal case than in the base case, a result 
that is expected. Also, because both the rest of the world and China are cutting back 
on emissions starting at the beginning of the next century, the difference in income 
loss occurs earlier than in the base case. 
Summary 
The model results are sensitive to the prescribed values of some parameters. 
This chapter examines only a few of the potentially large number of alternative values. 
Even this limited analysis indicates, however, that projected income losses and optimal 
emissions reduction rates can be quite sensitive to parameter values of different 
magnitudes. Given these results, it is suggested that the values of the parameters in the 





The results from DICE-CHN reported in Chapter IV suggest that, even from 
the perspective of China's own national interest, it is optimal for China to reduce its 
GHG emissions. It is beyond the scope of this study to evaluate the various means that 
China may use to accomplish this reduction. It is possible, however, to suggest 
promising alternatives for future evaluation. 
In a general sense, GHG emissions can be reduced by slowing the economic 
growth rate of China in the coming decades. Although projected income losses are less 
than 1 percent before 2085 even in the scenario of business-as-usual for both China 
and the rest of the world, the results of this study suggest that, given the behavior of 
the rest of the world, income losses are smaller when China follows the optimal 
emissions reduction path with emissions reduction rates greater than zero. 
The DICE-CHN results may actually provide just one more reason among 
many why China should slow its economic growth to a more moderate rate in the 
coming decades. The possibility of global climate change is only one of several 
environmental problems that China may have to face. Among the others are air and 
water pollution, deforestation, soil erosion, and desertification, and water shortage. 
These problems may have negative impacts on China's agricultural and other sectors. 
According to Brown (1995), the rapid industrialization of China leads to rapid 
increases in its national income. However, industrialization also causes large-scale 
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cropland losses. Higher income and larger population increase grain demand, while 
cropland losses and limited potential for increases in land productivity make it hard for 
grain supply to keep up. Given the magnitude of China's population and grain 
demand, attempts to eliminate grain shortages through imports might significantly 
affect the global grain market and grain prices. Slower economic growth, especially 
slower industrial growth, would presumably reduce the process of cropland losses and 
narrow the grain deficit, while providing the time for progress in agricultural 
technology. 
Not all experts agree with Brown, however. Many believe his projection 
represents the worst-case scenario arid does not consider producer and consumer 
responses to higher prices nor the high priority of grain self-sufficiency .in China. 
However, some believe that China will become a major grain importer in the coming 
decades (Rozelle, Huang, and Rosegrant, 1996). Brown's proposition that China will 
not be able to satisfy its own grain demand appears to be sound, although there is 
some uncertainty about the magnitude of the shortage. If grain self-sufficiency is really 
one of the top priorities of China, as most people believe, slower industrial growth 
would be in China's national interest since it would reduce cropland losses and·. 
increase China's grain supply capacity. 
Rozelle, Huang, and Rosegrant (1996) project that China's grain imports will 
not be as large as Brown's projection and that the magnitude of China's grain imports 
will not threaten to starve the world. One of the key assumptions of this projection is 
that China's agricultural research investment will increase by 3 percent per year, which 
has not always been true historically. If the investment in agricultural research is to 
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increase every year, it will be necessary to divert capital funds away from other 
sectors, such as manufacturing and construction. As a result, the industrialization 
process, in particular, and the economic growth, in general, will have to slow down, 
since the manufacturing and construction sectors still makes up about 50 percent of the 
economy and exhibit high growth rates. 
Slower economic growth reduces energy demand, which in turn reduces the 
amount of coal burning and current carbon dioxide emissions. It will also gain the 
valuable time for China to explore energy-source-switching potentials and agricultural 
technology improvement. Given more time, people may be able to better understand 
and adapt to a material-driven world, blunting the feverish pursuit of material benefits 
and all the negative side-effects that accompany them. In other words, with 
uncertainty, the best policy should be the so-called "no-regret" policy, and a more 
moderate growth rate may generate more benefits to the country than it costs in terms 
of delaying the time of reaching a certain income level. 
On a smaller scale, emissions may be reduced through several approaches, such 
as energy efficiency improvements and energy source switching. Reducing emissions 
through afforestation may help, but this would probably only be a temporary solution, 
since carbon released by dying trees at maturity offsets carbon sequestered by new 
trees. Afforestation also requires the diversion of considerable land area; in China's 
case, this would probably place extra pressure on agricultural and grain production. 
Energy efficiency in China is quite low compared to developed countries or 
even to other developing countries. Energy consumption per yuan of GDP for China is 
about twice the average of other developing countries (Wang, 1989, p. 41). According 
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to Zhuang, Zhai, & Kang (1992, p. 26), four energy-intensive industrial sectors 
(utilities, construction materials, metallurgicals, and chemicals) make up about half of 
China's energy demand. In each of these sectors, energy efficiency in China is more 
than 20 percent lower than that of the developed countries' average. This suggests the 
potential for considerable energy efficiency improvements through energy conservation 
and technology transfer. Lu (1991) forecasts a long-term energy conservation potential 
for China of more than 80 percent from 1980 to 2050 (p. 353). Although not as 
optimistic as Lu's, projections by others also show substantial potential for energy 
efficiency improvements. For example, Zhuang, Zhai, & Kang estimate that a 30 
percent reduction of energy consumption in the most energy-intensive sectors would 
be possible if sufficient capital investment were available (p.8). 
The Chinese government has strengthened measures in energy efficiency 
improvements through administrative, legislative, economic, and technological means. 
Significant progress has been achieved in this area as shown by the parameter 
DSIGMA (decline rate of the emissions-output ratio) in the DICE-CHN model. 
However, considerable future improvement in energy efficiency requires sufficient 
capital, which may not be available, or substantial energy price increases or 
government intervention, which the government may not want to risk. 
Cline (1992) summarizes the means of emissions reductions through energy 
source switching into several categories: 
1. Intra-fossil-fuel substitution (IFFS): substitution of more polluting fossil fuels 
(coal) by less polluting fuels (natural gas). 
2. Non-fossil fuel/fossil fuel substitution (NFFS): substitution of non-fossil fuels 
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(biomass, nuclear, solar, hydro, wind) for fossil fuels. 
3. Other-factor/energy substitution (OPES): substitution of other factors (labor and 
capital) for energy in the production process. 
4. Product substitution (PS): substitution of non-energy-intensive products for energy-
intensive products in the consumption mix. 
As discussed in Chapter II, China's reserves of other (lower carbon-
concentration) fossil fuels are relatively small, which makes it unlikely that China can 
substitute away from coal. China is already a net importer of oil, and the quantity of 
natural gas available is far less than the demand for energy even with China's 
ambitious plan of doubling natural gas production of 13 billion cubic meters in 1988 
by the beginning of the next century·. 
High capital cost and technical infrastructure requirements· make it hard for 
China to further pursue the nuclear· power option, especially when the lower cost 
option of coal burning plant is available. The exploitation of China's hydro potential 
also faces capital availability limitations. In the immediate future, biomass could be a 
significant alternative. Considering the magnitude of China's energy demand, 
however, none of these sources would be able to replace coal to any significant 
degree. The potential of substitution of energy by other production factors may be 
more limited than suggested by China's large population. Product substitution is worth 
exploring, but will be difficult to achieve as China's populace gains more purchasing 
power. 
In terms of carbon dioxide emissions, energy source switching will have very 
limited effects, primarily because coal will continue to be the dominant energy source, 
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satisfying about 70 percent of China's energy demand in the coming decades. As 
concluded by Streets, et al (p. 1034), "Even with great improvements in energy 
efficiency and switching whenever possible away from fossil fuels, it seems to be 
impossible to prevent a sizable increase in carbon dioxide emissions while maintaining 
a desirable rate of economic development. Investment in energy efficiency and 
alternative energy sources in China makes economic and environmental sense, but will 
serve to moderate emissions increases, not prevent them." 
These comments bring us back to the argument at the beginning of this chapter. 
The best way to reduce or to limit carbon dioxide emissions may be to slow economic 
growth to a more moderate rate. Also, slower economic growth may lessen the 
pressure on agricultural and grain production, and reduce the scope of other 
environmental problems. 
Another important ingredient may be the continuous success of China's 
population control policies. Much of the energy demand and enormous emissions is 
caused by the sheer magnitude of China's population. If population growth is reduced, 
so will be the demand for energy and the pressure on the environment. Failing to 
control the growth of its already huge population will definitely make emissions 
reduction a much tougher task for China. 
Strength/Weakness of the Approach and Suggestions for Future Research 
The original DICE model is a general equilibrium optimization model that 
captures the impacts of climate change on economic activities through the linkage 
between a traditional production function and a emissions-climate factor. The variable 
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control feature of DICE allows the model to be used to examine various policy options 
and their impacts on output levels and optimal emissions reduction rates. The structure 
of the DICE model also makes it possible to single out the emissions by specific 
countries and to estimate abatement costs and damages to those countries. Thus, 
DICE can be applied to the analysis of the contribution of specific countries to the 
problem of global warming and the impacts of climate change on those countries. 
As pointed out by Dr. Robert Costanza,5 "Nordhaus has gone further than any 
economist to date at building a dynamic integrated model of the world's climate and 
economic systems" and "a thorough job was done in analyzing the (DICE) model's 
sensitivity to uncertainty about the parameters." However, the one-way linkage 
between the climate and the economic systems is greatly simplified. Economic output 
is estimated using a Cobb-Douglas production function in which natural capital is 
completely missing. Therefore, economic growth is not limited by natural resources or 
environmental changes at all. This is a very serious more of a problem considering the 
fact that the purpose of the model is to assess the impact of environmental change on 
economic activities. More complex links between climate change and ecosystem 
changes, and between ecosystem changes and economic performance are needed in 
order to integrate economic models with the natural world. Also, utility or welfare in 
the DICE model is represented by consumption in the traditional sense. In other 
words, only market purchases of goods and services are considered to be sources of 
economic welfare. Nonmarket items such as leisure and enjoyment of the environment 
5 See Managing the DICE Model, Review of Nordhaus' Economics of Climate Change, 
by Robert Costanza, Center for Environmental and Estuarine Studies and Zoology 
Department, and Director, Institute for Ecological Economics, University of Maryland. 
This review is to appear in Environmental Science and Technology. 
111 
are not included as part of the economic welfare. This causes economic activities to be 
directed too much toward material growth while ignoring the importance of the 
nonmarket items such as environmental quality and may cause problems of "over 
growing" such as in China. 
Because DICE-CHN follows the assumptions and methodology of the DICE 
model it inevitably inherits the weaknesses of the DICE model. Further research is 
needed to incorporate more complex feedback relationships between the natural world 
and economic performance. Also, it would be desirable to include natural resources in 
the production function and to include nonmarket items such as the enjoyment of the 
environment in the measurement ofwelfare. 
Nonetheless, the DICE".'CHN model enables one to project the general 
dimensions of the role of China in generating global warming, and to estimate 
potential damages to China's economy. Thus, more refined version of DICE-CHN, 
especially those incorporating improved estimates of the critical parameters identified 
in Chapter V, have an important role to play in determining China's approach to the 
global warming problem. 
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APPENDIX A 
DICE-CHN IN CODE 
































Time periods in ten year intervals 
First time period (1975) 
Last time period (2215) 
Region (China) 
Elasticity of marginal utility (1) 
Rate of social time preference per year (0.03) 
Carbon removal rate per decade (0.0833) 
Marginal atmospheric retention rate (0.64) 
CO2-equivalent concentrations in 1975 (698 GtC) 
Thermal capacity of atmosphere (1/Rl or 0.226) 
Thermal capacity of oceans (l/R2 or 0.02) 
Thermal transfer from atmosphere to oceans (R2/TAU12 or 0.440) 
Climate feedback parameter (1.41) 
Lower stratum temperature ( degree C in 197 5 or O .1) 
Atmospheric temperature (degree C in 1975 or 0.4) 
Damage coefficient for CO2 doubling (fraction of GDP, or 0.0094) 
Emissions-output ratio (tons of carbon per 1000 yuan in 1978 or 1.135) 
Decline rate of emissions-output ratio per decade (0.45) 
Emissions by the rest of the world in 1975 (5.5 GtC) 
Growth rate of EROW per decade (0.23) 
Decline rate of GEROW per decade (0.13) 
Decline rate of technology per decade (0 .11) 
China's GDP in 1978 (0.359 trillion yuans) 
China's Population in 1975 (924.2 millions) 
China's population growth rate during 75-85 (0.16) 
Decline rate of China's population growth per decade (0.164) 
Intercept of control cost function (0.04) 
Exponent of control cost function (2.887); 
PARAMETERS 
L(T): Level of population 
GL(T): Growth rate of population 
SIGMA(T): Emissions-output ratio 
DSIGMA(T): Cumulative improvement of energy efficiency 
120 
EROW(T): Emissions by the rest of the world 
GEROW(T): Growth rate of EROW 
RR(T): Discount factor 
FORCOTH(T): Exogenous radiative forcings from other GHGs 
GQ(T): Growth rate of GDP 
TFIRST(T) = YES$(0RD(T) EQ 1 ); 
TLAST(T) = YES$(0RD(T) EQ CARD(T)); 
DISPLAY TFIRST, TLAST; 
GL(T) = (GLO/DGL)*(l-exp(-DGL*(ord(t)-1))); 
L(T) = LO*exp(GL(T)); 
DSIGMA(T) = (DSIGMAO/DELTAA)*(l-exp(-DELTAA*(ord(t)-1))); 
SIGMA(T) = SIGMAO*exp(DSIGMA(t)); 
GEROW(T) = (GEROWO/DGEROW)*(l-exp(-DGEROW*( ord(t)-1 ))); 
EROW(T) = EROWO*exp(GEROW(T)); 
DISPLAY L, SIGMA, EROW; 
GQ('l') = l; 
GQ('5') = 22.16; 
GQ('9') = 128.80; 
GQ('13') = 345.74; 
GQ('l 7') = 928.10; 
GQ('21') = 2491.35; 
GQ('25') = 6687.67; 
Display GQ; 
GQ('2') = 2.38; 
GQ('6') = 37.86;. 
GQ('IO') = 164.86; 
GQ('l4') = 442.55; 
GQ('18') = 1187.97; 
GQ('22') = 3188.93; 
RR(T) = ((l+RHO)**IO)**(l-ord(t)); 
FORCOTH(T) = 1.42; 
GQ('3') = 5.73; 
GQ('7') = 58.80; 
GQ('ll') = 211.03; 
GQ('15') = 566.47; 
GQ('19')= 1520.60; 
GQ('23') = 4081.83; 
GQ('4') = 11.81; 
GQ('8') = 91.31; 
GQ('l2') = 270.11; 
GQ('16') = 725.08; 
GQ('20') = 1946.37; 
GQ('24') = 5224.75; 
FORCOTH(T)$(ord(t) lt 14) = .3820+.l 18*ord(T)-.0034*ord(t)**2; 
Display RR, FORCOTH; 
VARIABLES 
MIUC(T): Emissions control rate of GHGs in China 
MIUO(T): Emissions control rate of GHGs in ROW 
FORCING(T):Radiative forcing in watts per squared meter 
TA(T): Atmosphere temperature in degree C 
TO(T): Lower ocean temperature in degree C 
M(T): CO2-equivalent concentration in billion tons of carbon or GtC 
E(T): CO2-equivalent emissions of the world in billion tons of carbon or GtC 
C(T): Consumption in trillion yuans 
CPC(T): Per capita consumption in thousand yuans 
YPC(T): Per capita income in thousand yuans 
Y(T): Income in trillion yuans 
Q(T): Output in trillion yuans 
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UTILITY; 



















Initial condition of GDP 
Output 
Consumption 
Per capita consumption 
Per capita imcome equation 
Emissions process 
Radiative forcing equation 
CO2 distribution equation 
Initial condition for M 
Temperature-climate equation for atmosphere 
Initial condition for atmospheric temperature 
Temperature-climate equation for lower oceans 
Initial condition for lower ocean 
QQO(TFIRST) .. Q(TFIRST) =E= QO; 
QQ(T) .. Q(T) =E= QO*GQ('l ')*GQ(T); 
EE(T) .. E(T) =G= SIGMA(T)*(l-MIUC(T))*Q(T)+(l-MIUO(T))*EROW(T); 
FORCE(T) .. FORCING(T) =E= 4.1 *(log(M(T)/590)/log(2))+FORCOTH(T); 
MMO(TFIRST) .. M(TFIRST) =E= MO; 
MM(T+l) .. M(T+l) =E= 590+BETA*IO*E(T)+(l-DELTAM)*(M(T)-590); 
TAEO(TFIRST) .. TA(TFIRST) =E= TO; 
TAE(T+l) .. TA(T+l) =E= TA(t)+Cl *(FORCING(t)-LAMBDA*TA(t)-C3*(TA(t)-
TO(t))); 
TOEO(TFIRST) .. TO(TFIRST) =E= TLO; 
TOE(T + 1 ) .. TO(T + 1) =E= TO(T)+C2*(TA(T)-TO(T) ); 
YY(T) .. Y(T) =E= Q(T)*(l-Bl *(MIUC(T)**B2))/(l +(Al/9)*SQR(TA(T))); 
CC(T) .. C(T) =E= 0.65*Y(T); 
CPCE(T) .. CPC(T) =E= C(T)* 1000/L(T); 
YPCE(T) .. YPC(T) =E= Y(T)*lOOO/L(T); 
UTIL.. UTILITY =E= SUM(T, lO*RR(T)*L(T)*LOG(C(T)/L(T))); 
* Upper and Lower Bounds: General for stability 
MIUC.up(T) = 1; 
MIUC.lo(T) = O; 
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MIUO.up(T) = 1; 
MIUO.lo(T) = O; 
TA.up(T) = 20; 
M.lo(T) = 600; 
C.lo(T) = 0.001; 
* Upper and lower bounds for historical constraints 
MIUC.fx('l ') = O.; 
MIUC.fx('2') = O.; 
MIUC.fx('3') = O.; 
MIUO.fx('l ') = O.; 
MIUO.fx('2') = O.; 
MIUO.fx('3') = O.; 
* Command and control constraint 
*MIUC.fx(T) = O.; 
*MIUO.fx(T) = O.; 
*MIUO.fx(T)$( ord(t) gt 3) = 0.2; 
* Solution options 
option nlp = minos5; 
option iterlim = 99900; 
option reslim = 99999; 
option solprint = off; 
option limrow = O; 
option limcol = O; 
model CO2 /all/; 
solve CO2 using nlp maximizing UTILITY; 




max ~ U[ c(t), L(t)] (1 +p )" 1 
C (t) t 
subject to economic constraints 
(1) U [c(t), L(t)] = L (t) {[c(t)]1-a - l} I (I- a) 
(2) c(t) = C(t) I L(t) 
(3) C(t) = 0.65Y(t) 
( 4) Y(t) = Q(t)Q(t) 
and emissions-climate-economic constraints 
(5) O(t) = [ ( 1 - b1 µ(t) b2 ) I ( 1 + <1>1 T(tyt'2 ] 
(6) TC(t) = Q(t) b1 µ(t?2 
(7) MC(t) = Q(t) b1b2 µ(t)<b2·1) 
(8) D(t) = Q(t) <1>1 T(tyt'2 
(9) T(t) = T(t-1) + ( 1 I R1 ) { F(t) - ').., T(t-1) - (R2 I -r12 ) [T(t-1) - O(t-1)]} 
(10) O(t) = O(t-1) + (l/R2 ) [T(t-1) - O(t-1 )] 
(11) F(t) = 4.1 log [ M(t) I 590] I log ( 2) + FO(t) 
(12) M(t) -590 = J3 E(T-1) + (l-6M) [M(t-1) - 590] 
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